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Environmental Rights in Theory and Practice
David P. Bryden*
During the 1960's, when environmental causes suddenly became

popular, legal scholars began to investigate the feasibility of using
common law remedies to abate pollution and to force administrative
agencies to be more responsive to environmental concerns. Most commentators concluded that various doctrines of administrative and
tort .law seriously and unduly handicapped plaintiffs seeking to protect the environment.' Many also suggested or implied that, if these
doctrines were liberalized, litigation would make a major contribution to improving environmental quality.2 The most elaborate and
ingenious statement of this thesis was Professor Joseph Sax's
Defending the Environment:A Strategy for Citizen Action, published
in 1971. Sax argued that the courts should play an enlarged role in
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I am indebted to two students-Mark Shepard and Frederick W. Reindel-for their diligent assistance in ascertaining the facts about the cases described in Part Ell of this Article and to Teresa Boe
and Karen Schaffer for helping with the footnotes. My colleagues John Cound and
Donald Marshall offered astute comments about the manuscript; William Lockhart
made equally valuable suggestions about organization of the Article. The empirical
research was made possible by a generous grant from the Minnesota Law Alumni
Association.
1. See, e.g., LAW AND THE ENviRoNM-NT (M. Baldwin & J. Page eds. 1970); Juer.
gensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights. 1967
DuKE L.J. 1126; Miller, Air PollutionControl:An Introduction to ProcessLiabilityand
Other Private Actions, 5 NEw ENGLAND L. REv. 163 (1970); Sive, Some Thoughts of
an EnvironmentalLawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. R'.
612 (1970); Note, ParticularProblems of Water Pollution Under New York Low and
Federal Law: A Summary of the Right of a Riparian to Pollute a Stream Under the
New York Common Law, 10 BurALo L. Rav. 473 (1961); Note, Private Remedies for
Water Pollution, 70 CoLum. L. REV. 734 (1970); Note, Stream Pollution-Recovery of
Damages, 50 IowA L. REv. 141 (1964); Note, Air Pollution Control in Minnesota, 54
MINN. L. REv. 953 (1970); Comment, Equity and the Eco.System: Can Injunctions
Clear the Air?, 68MICH. L. Rev. 1254 (1970); Comment, Air Pollution Control in Texas,
47 TEx. L. REv. 1086 (1969).
2. See, e.g., Berlin, Roisman, & Kessler, Law in Action: The Trust Doctrine, in

LAW AND THE ENVIRONWENT, supra note 1, at 166, 171, 181; Esposito, Air and Water
Pollution: What to Do While Waiting for Washington, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 32.
33, 52 (1970); Fernandez, Due Processand Pollution: The Right to a Remedy 16 Viu.
L. Rav. 789, 814 (1971); Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment: E=MAC-: Environment Equals Man Times CourtsRedoubling Their Efforts, 55 Commai. L. REv. 674,
682 (1970); Sive, supra note 1, at 613-14, 650; Note, ParticularProblems of Witter
Pollution Under New York and Federal Law: A Summary of the Right of a Riparian
to Pollute a Stream Under the New York Common Law, supra note 1, at 492; Note,
Private Remedies for Water Pollution, supra note 1, at 754-55; Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit: TraditionalDoctrinesand Evolving Theories to Control Pollution,
16 WAYNE L. Rev. 1085, 1114 (1970).
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environmental protection and endorsed the Michigan Environmental
Protection Act, which he had drafted, as an effective statutory means
of modifying or abolishing most of the doctrinal impediments to successful environmental litigation .
Although several states, including Minnesota, have passed
similar statutes,4 we still know very little about their effects. Are the
courts, freed from previous doctrinal constraints, now enjoining
industrial emissions, pesticide spraying, power plants, and the other
notorious causes of environmental degradation? What sorts of
parties have made use of the changes wrought by these acts, how
often have they prevailed, and how essential to their successes were
the doctrinal reforms?
As a contribution toward answering such questions, this Article
will examine the results of the first five years of litigation under the
Minnesota Environmental Rights Act.3 We will begin by tracing
briefly its intellectual genealogy: the perceived inadequacies of common law doctrines, Professor Sax's theories about environmental litigation, and finally the provisions of the statute itself. We will then
examine previously published studies of litigation under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act. With this background, we will
describe the cases that have arisen in Minnesota and compare their
results with the expectations expressed in the literature about
environmental rights.
I.
A.

THE GENEALOGY OF THE STATUTE

THE LIMITATIONS OF COMMON LAW CAUSES OF ACTION

Today it would be surprising to see a new article that discussed
the possibility of suing polluters for such a traditional tort as trespass.
But less than a decade ago the future of environmental law seemed
full of exciting possibilities. The National Environmental Policy Act,
had not yet produced the numerous cases requiring environmental
impact statements that are so familiar today. Air and water pollution
control legislation was still in a relatively primitive state.7 The evolution of such state-imposed land use controls as coastal and shoreland
zoning, power plant siting acts, and "critical areas" legislation had
3.

J. SAX,

DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971).

4. For a compilation of state acts, see DiMento, Citizen Environmental Litigation and the Administrative Process: Empirical Findings, Remaining Issues and a
Direction for Future Research, 1977 DUKE L.J. 409, 411 n.4.
5. MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.13 (1976).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1970) (enacted in 1969).
7. See generally Jorling, The Federal Law of Air Pollution Control, in FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1058, 1059-66 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974); Zener, The
FederalLaw of WaterPollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra at 682.
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scarcely begun. 8 No one knew what spectacular judicial decisions
might be in the offing, but some hoped that the Supreme Court would
take the lead, as it had done in civil rights and other areas of social
reform.'
Concerned.about the environment, scores of legal scholars posed
the question: what common law remedies are available against polluters and administrative agencies that either fail to perform their regulatory tasks properly or even-as in the case of highway departments-appear as leading villains in the drama? The answers were,
on the whole, rather discouraging. Suits against administrative agencies, for example, were often uncertain ventures.'" Although the federal courts were beginning to relax standing requirements so that
environmental organizations were sometimes able to surmount that
hurdle," the willingness of most state courts to follow these decisions
had not been tested.1 2 Moreover, standing was only the threshold
issue. Under the "substantial evidence rule," the courts would not
reverse an administrative decision, even if they thought it wrong, if
it rested upon some sort of rational basis.' 3 This limited scope of
review, so eminently sensible to an earlier generation of New Deal
reformers, was perceived as a major obstacle to environmental protection" because the new reformers regarded the agencies as hostile or
ineffective-more of a problem than a solution.
The law governing suits against private polluters was equally
discouraging-more suitable, some said, for a frontier society than for
contemporary conditions.'5 For this type of suit, less restrictive stand8. See generally F. BoSSELM AN & D. CALLES, THE QUIET REvOLTnON INLAND USE
CoNTROLs (1971); CoUNcIL ON ENVmONMENTAL QuALIrY, ENVIONMErAL QUALITY (annual reports 1970-1975); Note, State Land Use Regulation-A Survey of Recent Legislative Approaches, 56 MIN. L. REV. 869 (1972).
9. See, e.g., Esposito, supra note 2, at 45-51; Roberts, supra note 2, at 688-706.

10. See, e.g., Sive, supra note 1.
11. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n.
354 F.2d 608, 615 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
12. See 2 F. CooPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 541-44 (1965).

13. See Sive, supranote 1, at 617. Under the "substantial evidence rule" a court
must affirm an administrative factual finding if it is supported by "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
14. See Sive, supranote 1, at 617.
15. See, e.g., Berlin, Roisman, & Kessler, supra note 2,at 170; Krier.
Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 1, at 105, 107-08. The historical accuracy of this proposition is open to

question. Would it not be equally plausible to say that in a frontier society industry
can more readily be required to avoid disturbing individual landowners? Cf. Campbell
v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 586 (1876)("An injunction need not therefore. . . interfere
materially with the useful and necessary trade of brick making.... In this country
there can be no trouble to find places where bricks can be made without damage to
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ing requirements had not begun to evolve.'8 By and large, the common law remedies against pollution are designed to protect property
rights, not to vindicate ideological concern about ecological damage."
Accordingly, the plaintiff's standing usually depends upon a showing
that his proprietary interests have been adversely affected by the
defendant's conduct. For nuisance law, the most useful of the common law remedies for environmental harm, even an injury to a proprietary interest might not be sufficient. If the nuisance is so widespread as to be "public," the plaintiff has no standing unless he can
show that the injury to him differs "not only in degree but in kind"
from the injury to other citizens.2 Although the government may
bring suit against a public nuisance, its decision not to do so is often
characterized as "discretionary," meaning that mandamus will not
lie. 9
If the plaintiff established his standing to sue he still had to
overcome other, often equally formidable, legal difficulties. There is,
of course, no general common law tort of "environmental degradation." Depending upon the facts, any of several common law causes
of action might suffice, but all of them except nuisance are of limited
value even to property owners. Trespass, for example, is rarely helpful, since "[mlost courts require an actual occupancy of space before
a trespass will be recognized, and, therefore, have been reluctant to
permit such actions in an air pollution case."" Even nuisance law,
though broader than trespass, is no panacea. Aside from the standing
requirement, nuisance cases involve a two-step "balancing of the
equities." First, to prove a private nuisance, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant's pollution substantially and unreasonably interferes with his property rights."' Such a showing may be impossible,
for example, in a metropolitan area where contamination comes from
persons living in the community."). See also note 378 infra (discussing comparative
injury doctrine).
16. Cf. LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 71 (remarks of David Sive)
(observing that the recent liberal standing decisions dealt mostly with organizations,
not individual citizens, challenging administrativedecisions).
17. The public trust doctrine might be regarded as an exception to this proposition, but the historical scope of that doctrine is very narrow. See generally Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MiH. L. REV. 473, 475-91, 556 (1970).
18. See, e.g., Bouquet v. Hackensack Water Co., 90 N.J.L. 203, 101 A. 379 (1917);
Juergensmeyer, Common Law Remedies and Protection of the Environment, 6 U.
BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 215, 217 (1971).
19. See Jaffe, Standing to Sue in Conservation Suits, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 123, 131.
20. Note, The Viability of Common Law Actions for Pollution Caused Injuries
and Proof of Facts, 18 N.Y.L.F. 935, 958 (1973).
21.

W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 577-82 (4th ed. 1971).
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many sources and the residents are expected to endure a certain
amount of pollution.Y Second, even if the tort is established, injunctive relief-themost potent remedy-may be denied if the cost of
abatement is regarded as greatly disproportionate to the harm being
inflicted upon the plaintiff." Some scholars have noted that, in
applying this "comparative injury" doctrine, the courts generally fail
to take account of the effects of the pollution on nonparties, stressing
instead the potential impact of expensive abatement measures upon
jobs or the local economy."4
If he was able to meet these and other defenses,u the plaintiff
still had to contend with the ordinary burden of proof rule. Several
authors have suggested that this is the most serious problem confronting a plaintiff in environmental cases. 2 The effects of pollution
are frequently so complex, gradual, and largely speculativen that the
party with the burden of proof will lose. Consider, for example, the
manifest difficulty of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the emissions of a nearby factory caused a respiratory disease or that
the pollution of an urban river is, at any particular point, substantially due to effluent from a single plant located several miles upstream.
B.

TmE QUEST FOR SOLUTIONS

To some scholars, these doctrinal problems were just an aspect-and not the most fundamental one-of the inadequacy of litigation as a method for solving social problems. This view was ably
stated by Dean (then Professor) Hines:
Aside from the difficulties encountered in the pleading and
proof of a water pollution claim, several even more basic limitations
restrict the utility of private litigation as a pollution control device.
In the first place, court action is entirely too fortuitous an event to
serve as the basis for a reliable pollution control program. Litigation
is fortuitous in its timing, in the type of case that may arise, and in
22. See Comment, The Use of Private Actions to Control Environmental Pollution in Pennsylvania, 16 VELL. L. REv. 920, 931-32, 939, 951 (1971).
23. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870.
309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970); note 378 infra.
24. See, e.g., Juergensmeyer, supra note 18, at 232.
25. Other common law pitfalls for the environmental plaintiff included laches.

sovereign immunity, and prescriptive rights.
26. See, e.g., Note, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, supra note 1,at 745.
See also LAw AND Tm ENviRoNMENT, supra note 1, at 76 (remarks of Joseph Sax, Victor
Yannaconne, and David Sive); Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of
Water Quality, 52 IowA L. REv. 186, 198 (1966).
27. See generally Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. Rav. 371 (1974).
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the quality of presentation that may be made for each side. An
effective program of pollution control requires that the control
agency possess considerable expertise in the area of regulation and
that it have the capacity to plan ahead for anticipated problems.
Courts manifestly are not endowed with either of these features.
Further, to serve as an effective force in pollution control, the agency
responsible must have the ability to administer a flexible program
that involves remaining in contact with the party regulated to see
that the agency's orders are complied with. The traditional reluctance of courts to issue an affirmative order under equity powers
requiring the carrying out of some tasks demonstrates the limited
effectiveness of a court centered pollution control program. Courts
are simply not equipped for the surveillance, the policing and the
preventive activities required for efficient pollution abatement.
Finally, and perhaps of most importance, the adversary system
under which court proceedings are conducted does not adequately
assure representation of the public interest in pollution control. The
effect of an alleged pollution situation on the interests of the public
frequently may not be a part of either side's case. To be sure, any
judge worthy of his bench constantly considers the implications of
his decisions to the welfare of the general community, but a judge
is not omniscient and is generally limited in his knowledge of a
problem to the evidence that has been produced in the cases tried
before him. Considering the pollution problem in its totality, interests of the public in conserving and restoring the quality of the
community's water may considerably overshadow the interests of
the parties to any particular dispute. When such a situation occurs,
a sound pollution control program requires that the facts relating to
the public point of view be ferreted out and that these facts be
judged in the light of the community's water quality policy. Even
the most enlightened court, using all of the information gathering
techniques at its disposal, is not well suited to this undertaking."
The argument that the judicial role in protecting the environment must necessarily be relatively peripheral was unsatisfying to
most of those who wrote about environmental law. Without directly
disputing Hines, reformers reached different conclusions because
they started from different premises: that administrative regulation
had failed" or, as some put it, that we could not afford to wait for
improved legislative and administrative solutions because the sur28. Hines, supra note 26, at 200-01.
29. This was supported, for instance, by the fact that despite administrative
oversight Detroit's air was still badly polluted. See, e.g., Roberts, The Right to a
Decent Environment: ProgressAlong a ConstitutionalAvenue, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 134, 156 ("Anyone who has lived in the Midlands or tasted
the air in Detroit, to say nothing of Los Angeles, must retain a certain amount of
skepticism about the immediate efficacy of these [administrativel schemes.").
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vival of mankind might be at stake."
The solutions proposed by many of these writers were not very
convincing even if one accepts their premises. Some urged the courts
to invent new doctrines, but there were few signs-except in the
federal standing cases 3 1-that this would soon occur or that the doctrinal changes would be as comprehensive as environmentalists
wished. Others, evidently distrustful of every political and legal institution except the United States Supreme Court, wanted that Court
to fashion a constitutional right to a decent environment." One writer
even hoped that the Court would require abolition of the internal
combustion engine "with all due deliberate speed,"' ' but this fantasy
has faded from sight. 4
Those who sought judicial solutions to environmental problems
needed a better strategy. It would have to promise quicker and more
comprehensive results than piecemeal efforts to reform the common
law; and yet, ideally, it would also be less palpably utopian and
undemocratic than waiting for a bolt of lightning from the Supreme
Court. Moreover, although many judges were regarded as sympathetic to environmental concerns, 35 the judiciary had generally been
distinguished more by its conservatism than by its bold social activism .3 So the ideal strategy could not rely entirely upon the judges.
They needed guidance.
30. See LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 101 (remarks of Victor
Yannaconne) ("We have to go in right now and find a forum to do something about a
great many pressing toxic insults to the environment or there isn't going to be any
environment that we can do anything about."); id. at 250 (remarks of E. F. Roberts)
("[1]f we are going to get restructured before we are all dead, we can't wait for the
administrative or the political solution."); Comment, supra note 2, at 1085 ("Man
himself, as well as the natural resources upon which his life so intimately depends, is
threatened with premature elimination.").
31. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 2.
33. Id. at 692.
34. An even more exciting idea has recently been proposed: a constitutional
amendment that would give any citizen the right to sue in a federal court against any
conduct that "threatens to cause or is causing substantial harm to the safety or happiness of a consequential number of people." M. MtNrz & J. CoHFN, POWER, INC.: PUBUC
AND PRiVATE RuLSs AND How TO MAKE THEM AccoUNTAaLE 579 (1976). Doubtless, the
self-interest of law professors will lead us to oppose this one.
35. See text accompanying notes 49-50 infra.
36. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 2, at 701-04 (discussing Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S. 312 (1970)); Sax, supra note
17, at 551 (discussing Rogers v. City of Mobile, 277 Ala. 261, 169 So. 2d 282 (1964))
("a number of courts . . . persistently adhere to the belief that courts are not an
appropriate forum in which to examine issues concerning public trust lands").
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C. Defending the Environment
It was Joseph Sax who finally put the puzzle together, offering
environmentalists a theory about the role of environmental litigation.
The major premise of Defending the Environment is that
"environmental questions are preeminently problems caused by powerful and well-organized minorities who have managed to manipulate
governmental agencies to their own ends." 7 True, "[n]ew statutes
are abundant, but their rhetoric far exceeds their effect. ' 3 Even the
best agencies, staffed by conscientious and environmentally sensitive
appointees, are gravely and inherently flawed.3 They have, says Sax,
an insider perspective, meaning that their own bureaucratic selfinterest often leads them (quite sensibly, from their point of view) to
sacrifice environmental quality in one controversy in order to preserve their political capital for another battle tomorrow." Hence,
agencies inevitably tend to make suboptimal decisions, yielding to
pressure from a politician, for example, because they will later need
his support for an appropriation." This bureaucratic perspective exacerbates the "nibbling phenomenon," the process by which "large
resource values are gradually eroded, case by case, as one development after another is allowed.""2 With powerful economic and political forces seeking administrative approval of a single project-to
drain and fill a shoreland marsh, for instance-it is easy for an administrator to convince himself that "this is the last intrusion to be
permitted, that no bad precedent is being set, and that the line will
be drawn at the next case."43 After all, "[i]t is much easier to tell a
developer that he cannot dam up the Grand Canyon than to tell each
real estate investor, one by one over time, that he cannot fill an acre
or two of marshy 'waste' land."" Consequently, administrative
regulation will not prevent insidious, cumulative degradation of the
environment. "In these ways the administrative process tends to
produce not the voice of the people, but the voice of the bureaucrat
-the administrative perspective posing as the public interest."4,
Since these flaws of administrative regulation are attributable to
the self-interest of the bureaucracy, Sax says that it is "romantic" to
expect much from government reorganization, new commissions, re37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

J. SAx, supra note 3, at 239.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 52-53, 87-89.
Id. at 53, 88.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 55.

Id.
Id. at 56.
Id.
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quirements that projects be carefully planned, and similar efforts to
improve the administrative process." Such reforms "fail because they
do not change the balance of power-precisely what the development
of a scheme of enforceable legal rights, ,backed by judicial power, can
47
do."
Accordingly, the best solution is to expand the role of the courts
in resolving environmental disputes: "Simply put, the fact is that the
citizen does not need a bureaucratic middleman to identify, prosecute, and vindicate his interest in environmental quality. He is perfectly capable of fighting his own battles-if only he is given the tools
with which to do the job."" The judges, though they have often been
inhibited by "the mind-forged manacles of the law,"" are talented
decision-makers, potentially responsive to environmental complaints, 5' and, like the citizen plaintiffs, outsiders. If the oldfashioned doctrines were abolished by a statute, Sax concluded, there
would be a fundamental shift in the balance of power from bureaucrats to judges. Litigation would thus become the most important
(albeit not the sole) technique for regulating environmental quality.31
Much of the book is devoted to rebutting various reservations
concerning the propriety of expanding the judicial role. Responding
to the common objection that judges are unqualified to decide complicated scientific questions, Sax observes that courts often decide
cases inwhich technical issues abound, such as those involving products liability or medical malpractice.12 Besides, the judicial function
is not to decide what is the truth; it is to decide whether the party
s3
with the burden of proof has sustained it.
Finally, in most environmental cases, contrary to popular belief, the basic issue has to do with
"policy," not with science.54 Indeed, crucial administrative decisions
are often made by politically appointed lawyers, sometimes against
the advice of their expert staffs." Therefore, deference to the presumptive expertise of administrators is usually unfounded.While the administrative process is infected by the "disease" of
politics,5 judges are appointed without regard to their environmental
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 83.
(emphasis in original).
at 56.
at 125.
at 108, 147-48, 222-23.
at 60-61, 63, 83.
at 150.
at 147.
at 151.
at 27, 29, 32, 110.
at 29.
at 82.
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attitudes"8 and thereafter are not subject to the political pressures
that so often prevent administrators from reaching the right decisions.:" "[T]his, of course, is a tremendously liberating factor when
one considers the political dimension that plays so important a role
in the administrative process.""
Some may object that the judiciary should not be deciding such
questions as whether jobs or prices are more important than environmental quality. Sax agrees that environmental preservation may conflict with other values and that in a democracy the proper balance
should ultimately be determined by the legislature."' But he replies
that this principle, far from being a valid objection to citizen suits,
is perhaps their major justification.2 Commonly, Sax says, the function of courts in environmental cases is to promote a thorough legislative analysis of the questions being litigated. For example, a highway
department may decide to condemn some parklands for a highway."3
Although the legislature has conferred upon the department the
power of eminent domain, it may also have expressed its approval of
public parks, never explicitly addressing the question of which policy
is superior. By enjoining the proposed condemnation, a court forces
the highway department to seek specific legislative approval for its
project. Admittedly, it is never easy to obtain passage of a controversial bill. But it seems fairer to place the burden of obtaining a legislative resolution upon the party with superior access to the legislature,
which in environmental cases will usually be the industrial or governmental defendant, rather than the relatively powerless plaintiffs.
Should the defendant decide that such efforts are not worth the trouble, then presumably the enjoined project was not very important in
the first place. 4 By enjoining projects that lack specific legislative
authorization and that have substantial and often irreversible environmental consequences, the courts can achieve a sort of "legislative
remand," making democracy "work in practice as well as in school
book theory."'6 The purpose of creating a public right to environmental quality
is not, of course, solely to "make democracy work." Such a right will
also arrest pollution:
Environmental quality is threatened so often because we have not
put any price on it or marketed it as we do ordinary objects of
58. Id. at 109.
59. Id. at 108.
60. Id. at 109.
61. Id. at 237-39.
62. Id. at 57, 59-61, 113-14.
63. Id. at 176-80.
64. Id. at 202-04.
65. Id. at 58.
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private property. Clean air and water, public beaches, and open
space, for example, are treated as essentially free goods, and for that
reason it is little wonder that they have been used extravagantly.
[Such resources] are treated as free in large part because no
one has been entitled to assert a right in the maintenance of those
values: no member of the public has been permitted to claim a legal
right to the maintenance of clean air or water in the sense that the
owner of a specific tract of land may demand the protection of the
values inherent in that tract."
Injunctions can help to rectify this situation by forcing the defendants to seek "some form of genuine public assent,"' 7 presumably
from the legislature.

D. THE

MICHIGAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

ACT

Originally authored by Sax and passed by the Michigan Legislature shortly before Defending the Environment appeared, the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) was the legal embodiment of Sax's theories and was cited by him as a model law." The
Act eliminated or modified all of the common law doctrines that were
supposed to have inhibited the courts. MEPA created a new cause of
action, based simply upon conduct that "has, or is likely to pollute,
impair or destroy the air, water or other natural resources or the
public trust therein. . . ."" Restrictions on standing were abolished.
Under MEPA, anyone (including government agencies) may sue anyone else (again, including the government) for declaratory or injunctive relief.71 Prior recourse to an administrative agency is necessary
only if the court, in unspecified circumstances, decides that this is
desirable.7 ' If "there is involved a standard for pollution or for an
66. Id. at 58-59.
67. Id. at 59-60.
68. See MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West Supp. 1977); J. SAX.
supra note 3, at 247-52.
69. MiCH. Comp,. LAws ANN. § 691.1203(1) (West Supp. 1977).
70. Id. § 691.1202(1):
The attorney general, any political subdivision of the state, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any
person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity may maintain an action in the circuit court having jurisdiction where
the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any political subdivision thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity
for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources and the public
trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction.
71. Id. § 691.1204(2):
If administrative, licensing or other proceedings are required or available to determine the legality of the defendant's conduct, the court may
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anti-pollution device or procedure, fixed by rule or otherwise, by an
instrumentality or agency of the state or a political subdivision
thereof, '2 the court may "determine the validity, applicability and
reasonableness of the standard."73 If the standard is found to be
"deficient," the court may "direct the adoption of a standard approved and specified by the court."'"
The defendant may, of course, endeavor to rebut the plaintiff's
prima facie case,75 but the only affirmative defense set forth in the
Act requires a finding "that there is no feasible and prudent alternative to defendant's conduct and that such conduct is consistent with
the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare in light of the
state's paramount concern for the protection of its natural resources
from pollution, impairment or destruction.""
Thus, the burden of proof is the only traditional doctrinal problem to survive intact, and even this is partly a matter of form rather
than of substance. Although the plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case of "pollution, impairment or destruction," he need not establish
that the defendant's conduct is unreasonable because that issue is
subsumed under the affirmative defense, on which the defendant has
the burden of proof." In nuisance law, by contrast, the tort is defined
as "unreasonable" interference with the plaintiff's rights.78 Accordingly, in some jurisdictions the plaintiff's burden of proof extends
to the issue of reasonableness as well as the issue of harm.79 To this
extent, the Act effectively shifts the burden of proof.

remit the parties to such proceedings, which proceedings shall be conducted
in accordance with and subject to the provisions of Act No. 306 of the Public
Acts of 1969, being sections 24.201 to 24.313 of the [Michigan] Compiled
Laws of 1948. In so remitting the court may grant temporary equitable relief
where necessary for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources or the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction.
In so remitting the court shall retain jurisdiction of the action pending completion thereof for the purpose of determining whether adequate protection
from pollution, impairment or destruction has been afforded.
72. Id. § 691.1202(2).
73. Id. § 691.120 2 (2)(a).
74. Id. § 691.1202(2)(b).
75. Id. § 691.1203(1).
76. Id.
77. "Except as to the affirmative defense, the principles of burden of proof and
weight of the evidence generally applicable in civil actions in the circuit courts shall
apply to actions brought under this act." Id.
78. W. PROSSER, supra note 21, at 580-82.
79. Id. at 581 n.6.
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THE MINNESOTA ENVIRONiENTAL RIGHTs ACT

Despite several unique provisions, s° the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA)," enacted in 1971, embodies the principal
features of the Michigan Act. Every resident, government, or other
entity within the state has standing to sue under MERA.U The Act
authorizes suits to enforce existing environmental standards and requirements;3 suits to enjoin conduct that "materially adversely affects or is likely to materially adversely affect the environment";,"
intervention in or judicial review of administrative proceedings that
concern environmental matters;u and suits challenging the adequacy
of state environmental standards and actions." As in the Michigan
Act, although the plaintiff has the burden of proving environmental
harm, the issue of possible justifications is an affirmative defense."
Unlike MEPA, however, MERA expressly provides that "[elconomic considerations alone shall not constitute a defense hereunder.""1 This provision, while still rather ambiguous," clearly
evinces an intent to limit the relative hardship doctrine even more
than MEPA had done."
Predictably, the Minnesota Legislature was troubled by some of
the bill's implications, and the sponsors had to accede to several
amendments." In contrast to MEPA, compliance with relevant regulations or permits of certain state agencies (including the Pollution
Control Agency) is a defense to a MERA suit," but the effect of this
amendment is uncertain since another section of the Act entitles the
plaintiff to attack the regulation or permit as inadequate. 3 Therefore,
80.

See text accompanying notes 88-96 infra (discussing the major differences

between the MEPA and MERA).
81. MiNN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.13 (1976).
82. Id. § 116B.03(1).
83. Id. § 116B.02(5).
84: Id.
85. Id. § 116B.09. Compare MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 691.1205(l)-(2) (Vest
Supp. 1977).
86. MiN. STAT. § 116B.10 (1976).
87. Id. § 116B.04. Compare MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 691.1203(1) (West Supp.
1977). This summary of MERA omits some of its complexities. See generally Note, The
MinnesotaEnvironmentalRights Act, 56MNN. L. Rzv. 575,597,609-10,627-33 (1972).
88. Mom. STAT. § 116B.04 (1976).
89. When are economic considerations "alone"? Are such issues as jobs, prices,
and taxes simply "economic" or are they partly "social"?

90. Many of the lawyers who drafted MERA belonged to the Sierra Club. See
Note, supra note 87, at 577 n.15. Because they were apprehensive that MEPA's affirmative defense of no "feasible and prudent alternative" might perpetuate the cost
defense, see id. at 579, they persuaded the Minnesota Legislature to accept this provision.
91. Id. at 577-87.
92.

MINN. STAT. § 116B.03(I) (1976).

93.

Id. § 116B.10.
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the defense of compliance with a regulation may be available only
when the regulation itself is deemed to be strict enough. The sponsors
also agreed to an amendment that precludes suits against landowners
for conduct on their own land that "can not reasonably be expected
to pollute, impair, or destroy any other air, water, land, or other
natural resources located within the state . . . ."" Again, this concession seems insubstantial because almost any controversial activity
will affect resources beyond the defendant's property. Finally, in response to objections by rural legislators, an exemption was provided
for farm-related activity, 5 and suits based solely upon violations of
odor regulations were disallowed."
Whatever the significance of these amendments, however,
MERA clearly achieves Sax's major goal: it frees the courts from most
of the common law restraints, enabling them to articulate and enforce
a public right to environmental quality.
1I.

EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL

LITIGATION: SOME METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
A.

INTRODUCrION

Several studies of administrative agencies have revealed major
discrepancies between, as Sax puts it, the "school book" version of
their performance and the realities of administrative politics." When
evaluating the effectiveness of an administrative agency, we are likely
to ask, "Is it working? Are the rules being enforced? What, specifically, has it accomplished?" Such questions are asked much less
often about environmental litigation; and, when they are asked, we
often tacitly use different criteria in ascertaining the answer. If an
administrative agency adopts new procedures or listens to the testimony of an environmental group, we are apt to reserve judgment,
expressing considerable skepticism: "Yes, but how much good did it
do? Did the bureaucrats eventually ignore the advice of the citizens?
And what about all the other situations in which they are
procrastinating?"'" If, on the other hand, a court decides that a citi94. Id. § 116B.03(1).
95. Id. § 116B.02(2) provides an exemption for "a family farm, a family farm
corporation or a bona fide farmer corporation." In County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 2,13
N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. 1976), discussed at notes 338-53 infra and accompanying text,
the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted this exemption to apply only to "farming
or farm-related activity."
96. See MINN. STAT. § 116B.02(5) (1976); Note, supra note 87, at 585-86 & n.45.
97. See, e.g., D. BARNEY, THE LAST STAND (1974); D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK,
WATER WASTELAND (1971).

98. See, e.g., J. SAX, supra note 3, at 90-95. Although Sax states that the Environmental Quality Council "has been less than a smashing success during its first year
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zens' group has standing to sue an administrative agency, this is
hailed as a great victory for conservation, with scarcely any doubts
expressed about the consequences of the decision, as if standing
were the ultimate objective."
Of course, if one were chiefly interested in litigation as a means
for resolving particular disputes justly, rather than for achieving
other social objectives, such as conservation of natural resources, one
could say that standing and other doctrinal questions are the ultimate issues. It may be just, for example, to allow the Sierra Club to
sue the Environmental Protection Agency, irrespective of whether
that decision affects environmental quality. From this point of view,
We would measure the results of litigation differently from the results
of other kinds of regulation because we expect it to serve different
ends. The courts are to resolve certain kinds of disputes fairly; the
legislatures and administrative agencies are to do that too, but they
are also to establish the proper balance between environmental
quality and conflicting objectives.
Much can be (and has been) said for this rather crude distinction.1°° -It is clear, however, that the distinction does not accurately
reflect what many writers profess to expect from environmental litigation. The school of thought described above, culminating in
Defending the Environment, maintains that lawsuits brought by aggrieved citizens will have a major impact on environmental quality,
provided that the courts are not severely constrained by inherited
doctrines. 0 1 It is therefore appropriate to ask, what is the evidence
for this proposition? As in most fields of law, the evidence is extremely meager. Basically, we presume that doctrines tend to be
effective.
Doubtless, this presumption is partly due to the complexities of
empirical research. It is extremely difficult to evaluate the effects of
of operation," id. at 95, one may ask, how many judicial doctrines have been a
"smashing success" during their first year of operation?

99. Here and there one finds a glimmer of skepticism, but by and large all of the
sources cited in note 1 supra seem to take it for granted that by changing various
features of the law applicable to environmental litigation the courts would necessarily
change the quality of the environment. Even when judges reject environmental claims,
they are sometimes praised for having examined the merits of the case more closely
than usual. See, eg., Krier, supra note 15, at 111-14. Of course, such praise may be
deserved, and such decisions may eventually have salutary effects. But it does not
make sense to presume that judicial rhetoric is more efficacious than bureaucratic
rhetoric.
100. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 222-23, 257
N.E.2d 870, 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314-15 (1970).
101.

"Indeed, if we could get the courts to adapt the nuisance concept to public

rights in environmental quality, we would be far down the road toward coping with
the problems of environmental quality." J. SAx, supra note 3, at 160.
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a doctrinal change, even in a single jurisdiction. The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, for example, may affect conduct in three ways.
First, there are the direct effects of litigation: a company either is
ordered or agrees to stop discharging a certain pollutant into a lake.
Second, there are threats of suits, which sometimes have effects similar to actual litigation. Finally, the doctrinal change may affect conduct in many situations where no one has yet even threatened to sue,
just as an employer usually pays the minimum wage prescribed by
law without expressed threats of litigation.
The inquiry becomes even more complex when we try to answer
questions concerning the propriety (as opposed to the efficacy) of the
doctrinal changes. We must then answer such questions as whether
numerous frivolous suits are being brought under MERA, whether
litigation under this Act is causing congestion of court calendars, and
whether the'judges are usurping legislative prerogatives or incompetently deciding complicated factual questions.
Perhaps because of these difficulties, there is a tendency to describe cases selectively for exhortative purposes: "Here's an example
of how well litigation can solve a problem." This sort of Horatio Alger
story-common in articles about environmental law-is legitimate
only to the extent that one scrupulously avoids confusing the question
of what is possible with the question of what is typical.' 2
Notwithstanding these complexities, it is important to begin
studying the actual consequences of doctrinal change in environmental law. The literature is already overburdened with unsubstantiated
rhetoric and theory. The uncertainties of empiricism in this area are
real. But they should lead us to keep our diction modest and our
conclusions tentative, rather than prevent us from examining the
problem at all.
With these thoughts in mind, we will now examine studies of
litigation under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act.

B.

THE MICHIGAN STUDIES

There have been three empirical studies of litigation under
MEPA, two of which were co-authored by Professor Sax.' 3 These
102. Obviously, it is not only legitimate but desirable for authors to laud excellent decisions, doctrines, and statutes. But a collection of beautiful decisions, see, e.g..
Sax, supra note 17, tells us as little about the effects of doctrine on environmental
quality as a collection of biographies of self-made men tells us about social mobility
in America.
103. Haynes, Michigan'sEnvironmental ProtectionAct in Its Sixth Year: Substantive Environmental Law from Citizen Suits, 53 J. URw. L. 589 (1976); Sax &
Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70
MICH. L. REv. 1003 (1972); Sax & DiMento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years'
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studies, which cover the period from MEPA's enactment on October
1, 1970, to March 1, 1976,104 were undertaken with multiple purposes:
to provide lawyers with information about unreported cases;'* "to
help citizens assess the desirability of such legislation in [other]
states"; "6 and to serve as experiments "in efficacy research.""'
During this five and one-half year period, MEPA was invoked in
120 cases or administrative proceedings.'" Somewhat surprisingly,
permanent environmental groups with more than local concerns were
plaintiffs or intervenors in only nine cases;'" local and ad hoc groups
were similarly involved in 25 suits."' The single most common plaintiff (twelve cases) was the Wayne County Health Department."'
Public agencies were plaintiffs or intervenors in 43 cases and defendants in 60 cases.11 2 The most frequent issue was land use (50 cases),
ranging from homesite development to stream channelization, followed by air pollution (39 cases) and water pollution (17 cases). ' 3
During the period covered by the studies, there were 47 successful
MEPA suits and 28 unsuccessful ones; eleven suits were not pursued,
and the rest were pending when the final study was published."'
The authors conclude that the fears of MEPA's opponents were
unwarranted. To begin with, "[w]hen the environmental issues have
been presented, the courts have in the vast majority of cases understood them and been able to cope with them intelligently.""115 Also,
contrary to the fears of some opponents of the Act, defendants have
not been harassed by multiple suits about the same environmental
Experience Under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4

EcoLOy L.Q. 1

(1974). See generally DiMento, Citizen Environmental Legislation in the States: An
Overview, 53 J. URB. L. 413 (1976); see also DiMento, supra note 4; Sax, Environmental Action: A Passing Fad?, NAT. HisT., June-July 1976, at 10; Note, Michigan
EnvironmentalProtectionAct: PoliticalBackground, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REF.358 (1970).
104. Haynes, supra note 103, at 590, 591 n.4.
105. See Haynes, supra note 103, at 590-91; Sax & Conner, supra note 103, at
1004-06; Sax & DiMento, supranote 103, at 2-6 (introductory note from Professor Sax).
106. Sax & DiMento, supranote 103, at 2 (introductory note from Professor Sax).
107. Id. at 3.
108. Haynes, supra note 103, at 592 & n.8. Although the text says 119 cases, the
footnote adds one case and suggests two additional cases involving MEPA claims.
109. Id. app. D, at 689-90. Such groups participated as amici curiae in five
additional cases. Id.
110. Id. app. D, at 690-91. These local and ad hoc groups participated in 23 cases
as plaintiffs, 1 as an intervenor, 1 as a defendant and 1 in which the role is not
indicated. Id. See also id. at 582 n.8.
111. Id. app. D, at 689.
112. Id. app. D, at 686-89.
113. Id. app. E, at 692-95.
114. Id. app. F, at 696-98.
115. Sax & Conner, supra note 103, at 1009-10.
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issue,"6 and preliminary injunctions have not caused unjustifiable
delays of projects." 7
Although many suggestive tidbits of information are offered concerning MEPA's impact on the environment, the treatment of this
subject suffers from major defects. The authors chose to address
several disparate topics, including how MEPA should be interpreted,
whether the judges had performed competently, the role of lay witnesses, procedural issues, and security bonds. As a result, the articles
move from pending cases to resolved cases, from a lengthy description
of one case to a cursory reference to another, in a manner that compounds the intrinsic difficulties of gauging MEPA's substantive impact."' More important, even the decisions that are fully described
are difficult to evaluate because the authors rarely discuss whether
the MEPA count was essential to the result in the case. It seems clear
that other causes of action usually were or could have been joined
with the MEPA counts,"' yet the "successful" cases are generally
treated as indicative of MEPA's impact, even though no effort is
made to demonstrate that they would not have been brought, or
would have been decided differently, under more traditional theories.
The criteria used in these studies to evaluate the impact of litigation are far more charitable than those normally applied to administrative achievements. Professor Sax does acknowledge that the
MEPA cases have been unspectacular:
Nothing that has occurred under the [M]EPA has approached the
sort of big-time test litigation with which the legal literature is generally concerned. Indeed, with a few rather tentative exceptions, the
[M]EPA has not been used in a major assault against the biggest
actors in the state-the auto industry, agriculture, the electric generating utilities, or even the rapidly developing oil and gas or mining
operations. '"
Despite this concession, the articles repeatedly attribute significant
results to a rather unimpressive record. For example, after only thirteen cases had been resolved under MEPA, the first of these studies
116. Sax & DiMento, supra note 103, at 37-39.
117. Haynes, supra note 103, at 651-58.
118. This observation is not meant to imply that another methodology would
have been preferable, given the relatively large number of cases and the authors'
multiple goals.
119. "The majority of cases in which MEPA is a cause of action also include
other statutory, common law, or constitutional claims." Haynes, supra note 103, at
651; see id. at 645, 658; Sax & Conner, supra note 103, at 1025, 1030, 1054, 1066; Sax
& DiMento, supra note 103, at 26, 35-36, 42. Only about one-third of the cases in which
MEPA was invoked were based solely on MEPA. Haynes, supra note 103, at 651 n.248.
120. Sax & DiMento, supra note 103, at 5-6 (footnotes omitted)(introductory
note from Professor Sax).
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concluded that "enough cases have been resolved speedily and intelligently to mark the Act as a success."'' The authors treat even unsuccessful suits as achievements. For example, one suit was brought to
challenge the Michigan Department of Natural Resources' plan to
allow antlerless deer hunting.1" Although the article describing the
case acknowledges that the Department's experts demolished the
plaintiffs' case at trial, its authors nonetheless conclude that the
litigation was-a triumph for which MEPA deserves credit because it
strengthened the Department's hand politically in dealing with a
controversial issue of game management.In Another losing suit'2' was
praised because it "brought the essential issues into the open with
sufficient clarity that the court was able to handle them intelligently."'
The articles also suggest that the success of the Act may be
measured in terms of its broad educational achievements: partly the
awareness imparted to lawyers, but mostly the effect that a greater
awareness has had on "ordinary citizens." For instance, by learning
that they can "successfully fight established interest groups . . .
[citizens] are learning that citizenship means participation, which
may involve far more than writing letters to the editor or signing
petitions."''2 In addition, the use of ordinary citizens as lay witnesses
"has produced a sense of citizen involvement which may be obscured
by the maps and technical reports of experts."'" One of the benefits
of this citizen involvement is said to be a broadened understanding
of the importance of proposed environmental legislation.'" Indeed, at
one point Professor Sax states, "I have always viewed the [MIEPA
largely as a tool for education and institution-building on the local
level."9

Such assertions about the effects of MEPA would hardly be
taken seriously if they were cited as significant results of regulation
by an agency whose,mission was to improve environmental quality.'"
Nowhere in these studies is a connection between MEPA and any
specific large-scale improvement in environmental quality demon121. Sax & Conner, supra note 103, at 1080.
122. Id. at 1031-35 (discussing Payant v. Department of Natural Resources, No.
1100 (Cir. Ct., Dickenson County, Mich., Oct. 7, 1971)(complaint filed July 13, 1971)).
123. See id.
124. Muskegon County v. Environmental Protection Organization, No. C.5585
(Cir. Ct., Muskegon County, Mich., May 18, 1971)(complaint filed Mar. 15, 1971).

125. Sax &Conner, supra note 103, at 1037.
126. Sax &DiMento, supranote 103, at 6 (introductory note from Professor Sax).

127. Id. at 25.
128. Id. at 13 n.48.
129. Id. at 5 (introductory note from Professor Sax).
130. See text accompanying notes 97-100 supra.
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strated, and even the general attitudinal claims amount to little more
than bare assertions. Although one should not belittle the importance
of affording a hearing to aggrieved citizens, neither should one assume that a few lawsuits, initiated by a minuscule fraction of Michigan's people (and, one supposes, representing an almost equally
small percentage of those with environmental grievances), have had
much effect on the feelings of the vast majority of "ordinary citizens."
It is doubtful whether citizens would be less aware of the importance
of proposed legislation if they lacked the standing to sue conferred by
MEPA, and it seems unlikely that much of the effective support for
such legislation is attributable to MEPA suits.
The nebulous character of other conclusions makes them similarly questionable. The claim that MEPA has been responsible for
"institution-building at the local level""'' is difficult to appraise because the nature and importance of the "institutions" attributable to
MEPA are not described. The allegation that MEPA has had an
educational impact is, standing alone, impossible to evaluate; just
about everything-perhaps even a faculty meeting-can be called
"educational."
In short, the authors exalt litigation under circumstances in
which administrative regulation would be described as demonstrably
feeble. It is with a view toward taking a somewhat more critical look
at the effects of environmental litigation that the study reported in
this Article was undertaken.
C.

THE MINNESOTA STUDY

This study covers cases arising under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act during the five-year period from its effective date,
June 8, 1971, until June 8, 1976. The analysis will be confined to cases
that were resolved during the study period. Since there were only 26
such cases, 3 the results of each case in which the plaintiff even
partially prevailed will be described, while the unsuccessful suits will
be summarized in the Appendix.13 An attempt will also be made to
131. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
132. The cases were obtained from five sources: (1)The Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency (Rights Act plaintiffs must "cause a copy of the summons and complaint to be served upon the attorney general and the pollution control agency" within
seven days after commencing the action. MINN. STAT. § 116B.03(2) (1976)); (2) county
attorneys; (3) district court judges; (4) staff attorneys for the Pollution Control Agency
and the Department of Natural Resources; and (5) prominent environmental lawyers.
Since the PCA's file proved to be incomplete, some cases may have been omitted,
especially ones in which the Rights Act count was relatively peripheral or in which a
settlement was quickly reached. But it seems unlikely that the undiscovered cases, if
any, are numerous or important enough to affect the Article's conclusions.
133. Pp. 221-28 infra.
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determine whether MERA affected the result, relying largely upon
the opinions of the attorneys who represented the parties. Although
such opinions are fallible, they surely are more reliable than the
assumption that every case in which MERA was one of the plaintiff's
legal theories is indicative of the Rights Act's influence.
While these cases, taken as a whole, provide an adequate basis
for some tentative conclusions about the impact of Rights Act litigation on Minnesota's environment, a caveat is in order at the outset.
First, the period covered is relatively short and the statute is relatively new. Consequently, any conclusions are inevitably preliminary. Second, the Act may have had some potentially significant
indirect effects that will not be reflected in the cases themselves. For
instance, with one exception,'' the study does not provide evidence
about the effects of threats to sue under MERA because it is not
feasible to determine how many such threats have been made or to
appraise their impact accurately. We have also refrained from trying
to measure the effect of the statute and of suits under it upon environmental decisions that were not litigated. That question, although
enormously important, is difficult to answer, even in an article that
does not endeavor to answer other questions as well. To date there
have been very few cases under MERA in which the courts have laid
down standards that are likely to affect the conduct of many nonparties. It therefore seems premature to determine whether MERA litigation or the statute itself has changed bureaucratic and corporate
behavior.
III. THE MINNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ACT:
FIVE YEARS OF LITIGATION
A.

WATER POLLUnON

In eight MERA cases, water pollution was the major ground of
the complaint. Three of these suits were unsuccessful;' the plaintiffs
prevailed in four; and in one case the effect of the suit is unclear.
1.

State ex rel. Trierweiler v. Longhenry'31
The parties owned adjacent tracts abutting a rural lake.n

134. State ex rel. Nature Conservancy v. Square Butte Elec. Coop., No. 10638
(Dist. Ct., Wilkin County, Minn., filed Oct. 9, 1975), discussed at notes 308-22 infra
and accompanying text.
135. These cases are discussed in the Appendix at pp. 221-23 infra.
136. This case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents
on file at the district court, State ex reL Trierweiler v. Longhenry, No. 11117 (Dist.
Ct., Pine County, Minn., filed Aug. 28,1974); Telephone Interviews with James Bodin,
Attorney for Plaintiff Trierweiler (Aug. 12 &Nov. 10, 1976); Telephone Interview with
Richard Hart, Attorney for Defendant (Oct. 25, 1976).
137. Island Lake in Pine County is 580 acres in size. UNlva-srry oF MiNNEsoA,

MINNESOTA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 62:163

Longhenry and his wife operated a small resort on their tract. Their
septic tank drainfield system was malfunctioning, and the discharge,
instead of percolating underground, had formed a trench that cut
through Trierweiler's beach before draining into the lake. The odor
from this trench had allegedly prevented Trierweiler from using his
beach, 38 and fecal coliform counts indicated a potential health hazard in his swimming area.' 3' Trierweiler filed a complaint under
MERA, seeking an injunction against further use of the septic tank
system. The case was settled before trial, when the defendant agreed
to replace the septic tank with a holding tank.'
Although the activity in this case appears to have been an ordinary nuisance,"' the plaintiff's lawyer considered MERA an adequate ground for relief and therefore did not add a nuisance count.",
2.

3
State v. Metropolitan Sewer Service Board"

The Sewer Board's employees, represented by a union, were engaged in a prolonged dispute with the Board concerning wages and
failed to report to work for two days. As a result, the sewage from the
Board's treatment plant was discharged into the Mississippi River
without proper treatment. The State of Minnesota and the City of St.
MINNESOTA'S LAKESHORE: PAirr 2: STAnsTIcAL SUMMARY 50 (1970) [hereinafter cited as

(summary report of the Minnesota Lakeshore Development
Study).
138. See Affidavit of Trierweiler, State ex rel. Trierweiler v. Longhenry, No.
11117 (Dist. Ct., Pine County, Minn., filed Aug. 28, 1974).
139. See Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit B, State ex rel. Trierweiler v. Longhenry, No. 11117 (Dist. Ct., Pine County, Minn., filed Aug. 28, 1974).
140. A holding tank is a sewage disposal system from which the effluent is
periodically hauled away rather than allowed to percolate through the soil as with a
septic tank drainfield system.
141. Nuisance actions have been successfully maintained to enjoin activities that
create "noxious and unwholesome odors." Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 112,
29 N.W.2d 1, 6 (1947); Lead v. Inch, 116 Minn. 467, 134 N.W. 218 (1912). It has also
been held that the drainage of waste water upon another's land so that his land was
submerged and his vegetation killed constituted a nuisance. See Herrmann v. Larson,
214 Minn. 46, 7 N.W.2d 330 (1943); cf. Earl v. Clark, 219 N.W.2d 487 (Iowa 1974)
(drainage of wastes from a cattle feedlot enjoined as a nuisance).
142. Bodin Interviews, supra note 136.
143. This case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents
on file at the district court, State v. Metropolitan Sewer Serv. Bd., No. 385056 (Dist.
Ct., Ramsey County, Minn., Oct. 12, 1972) (complaint filed June 16, 1972); Telephone
Interview with Daniel Flicker, Attorney for the City of St. Paul (Nov. 1, 1976); Telephone Interview with James T. Hansing, Attorney for Defendant Engineers Union
(Oct, 25, 1976); Telephone Interview with Geoffrey P. Jarpe, Special Assistant Attorney General for the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (Oct. 25, 1976); Telephone
Interview with Jon Morgan, former Assistant Attorney General for the Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency (Oct. 25, 1976); Telephone Interview with John Zwakman,
Attorney for the Metropolitan Sewer Service Board (Oct. 26, 1976).
MINNESOrA's LAKESHORE]
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Paul sued the union, the employees, and the Board. They sought an
injunction restraining the union and the employees from their allegedly illegal strike, on the ground that it had contributed to a violation
of water quality standards promulgated by the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency (PCA) and thereby creating an enjoinable public
nuisance under Minnesota statutes."' In addition, the complaint asserted a cause of action under MERA and sought an order directing
the Sewer Board to formulate a plan for similar emergencies." 5
The trial judge granted the injunctions against the union and the
employees, mentioning MERA only by noting that the Act authorizes
injunctions.' 4' The suit against the Sewer Board was settled by stipulation when the Board drafted an emergency plan."'
Since state law authorizes injunctions against violators of PCA
regulations," s the PCA's lawyers normally do not add a Rights Act
count to their complaints."' They did so in this case, partly to ensure
that no question could be raised about St. Paul's standing as coplaintiff, and partly because the lawyer who was primarily responsible for
preparing the PCA's case thought that the time had come to acquaint
the courts with MERA.' 5 None of the attorneys associated with the
case, however, believes that MERA affected the outcome.'5
3. Bergquist v. City of Detroit Lakes 5 '
The city began condemnation proceedings against Bergquist and
144.

Plaintiffs Complaint at 4, State v. Metropolitan Sewer Serv. Bd., No.

385056 (Dist. Ct., Ramsey County, Minn., Oct. 12, 1972) (complaint filed June 16,
1972) (citing MnN. REG. WPC 15, 18 (1977) (to be codified in 6 MINN. CODE AG.cY
RuLEs §§ 4.8015, .8018)).

145.

Plaintiff's Complaint at 4, 6, State v. Metropolitan Sewer Serv. Bd., No.

385056 (Dist. Ct., Ramsey County, Minn., Oct. 12, 1972) (complaint filed June 16,
1972).

146. State v. Metropolitan Sewer Serv. Bd., No. 385056 (Dist. CL. Ramsey
County, Minn., Oct. 12, 1972).
147. Id.

148.

MmN.

STAT.

§ 115.071(1), (4) (1976).

149. Jarpe Interview, supra note 143.
150. Id.
151. Flicker Interview, supra note 143; Hansing Interview, supra note 143; Jarpe
Interview, supra note 143; Zwakman Interview, supra note 143.
152. This case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents
on file at the district court, Bergquist v. City of Detroit Lakes, No. 18586 (Dist. Ct.,
Becker County, Minn., filed Dec. 27, 1973); Telephone Interview with Grant Merritt,
former Executive Director of the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (Oct.26, 1976);
Telephone Interview with James 0. Ramstad, Attorney for Defendant (Aug. 4. 1976);
Telephone Interviews with Stephen Van Drake, Attorney for Plaintiffs (July 23, Aug.
4, & Oct. 26, 1976); Telephone Interview with Dale Wikre, Facilities Division. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (Aug. 26, 1976); Telephone Interview with Mike Zagar,
Engineering Review Unit, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (Nov. 1, 1976).
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others to obtain land for a new sewage treatment system. Most of the
land in question was on the shores of a small lake that for many years
had been used for sewage disposal.' There were no homes around the
lake, and although it served as a nesting area and refuge for ducks,
it was generally unsuitable for recreation.'" A ditch connected the
lake to a river and a chain of other waters. Under the city's old sewage
disposal methods, the effluent was discharged into the lake, through
which some of it made its way into the river.'"
The city proposed to close off the outlet, thereby transforming
the lake into a closed storage basin for the sewage. Under this plan
the water would be drawn off and used for spray irrigation during the
summer. This plan involved some relatively new techniques, and
because of various potential problems, including the possibility of
pollutant seepage out of the lake, its precise effects on water quality
were admittedly uncertain.' 6 Nevertheless, the basic issue was
whether the lake should be sacrificed in order to prevent pollution
from flowing into other waters in the chain.' 5
The city sought to obtain title to all the shorelands around the
lake so that it could control the water level without affecting private
property.' 58 Despite the polluted condition of the lake, the undeveloped farmland around it was valuable because it lay in the path of
expanding residential development around the city.' 9 Determined to
resist condemnation, the landowners filed a suit under MERA, alleging that the property in question contained marshes that were valuable habitats for waterfowl and other wildlife. After retaining a professional engineer, they proposed an alternative disposal plan under
which the lake would not be closed off, but instead the sewage would
be more thoroughly treated before being discharged.'60 Armed with
this plan, the landowners gained support from some Pollution Control Agency officials,' 6' whereupon the city decided to adopt the
153. The lake was St. Clair Lake in Becker County. See generally MINNESOTA'S
supra note 137, at 19.
154. Ramstad Interview, supra note 152.
155. Id.; Van Drake Interviews, supra note 152; Wikre Interview, supra note

LAKESHORE,

152.
156. Ramstad Interview, supra note 152.
157. Id.; Van Drake Interviews, supra note 152.
158. See Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 2, Bergquist v. City of Detroit
Lakes, No. 18586 (Dist. Ct., Becker County, Minn., filed Dec. 27, 1973) (amended
complaint filed Jan. 22, 1974); Ramstad Interview, supra note 152.
159. Van Drake Interviews, supra note 152.

160. Id.
161. From talking with Agency officials, one gets the sense that the original
plan was questionable on scientific grounds. In addition, there was political pressure
from both sides. The prospect of protracted litigation may have been unattractive
to everyone concerned; for one thing, the cost of the project was rising with every

ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS

1978]
612
landowners' plan.

The attorneys involved disagree about the effect of MERA on
this controversy. While the landowners' lawyer is quite certain that
the settlement could not have been obtained without the leverage
conferred by MERA,'1 the city's lawyer attributes the settlement
more to the unforeseen, vigorous opposition than to the legal merits
and therefore believes that the result probably would have been the
same without MERA.'11
4. McBurney v. Loris'
This suit was brought by several owners of riparian land on
Christmas Lake and its primary tributary, Christmas Lake Creek,
located in the suburbs of Minneapolis. Two months before the suit,
the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency had studied Christmas
Lake, concluding that its water quality, although still "excellent,"
had been steadily deteriorating, as evidenced by increasingly severe
algal blooms.'66 The PCA study identified various sources of the nutrients that were contributing to algal growth in Christmas Lake,
including the defendants' horse stable and riding academy, situated
on land abutting the creek.
The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the defendants had failed
to adopt adequate measures to minimize the drainage of nutrients
from horse manure into the creek and argued that these malpractices
violated the terms of a conditional use permit that the defendants
had obtained from local zoning authorities, created a common law
nuisance, and caused pollution and impairment of water resources in
violation of MERA.1

7

After a trial on the merits, the judge found that "the heavy loads
of nutrients and phosphorus being discharged.

. .

have contributed

to the increased algae production and nuisance blooms of aquatic
organisms. . . so as to unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoymonth of delay. Id.; Wikre Interview, supra note 152.
162. Although this alternative was considerably more expensive, the impact was
softened by federal funding. Van Drake Interviews, supra note 152.

163.

Id.

164. Ramstad Interview, supra note 152.
165. This case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents
on file at the district court, McBurney v. Loris, No. 14411 (Dist. Ct., Carver County,
Minn., June 27, 1975) (complaint filed July 26, 1973); Telephone Interview'with Raymond Haik, Attorney for Plaintiff McBurney (Nov. 3, 1976); Telephone Interview with
L. M. Schmithuber, Attorney for Defendant Loris (July 1, 1977).
166. McBurney v. Loris, No. 14411 (Dist. Ct., Carver County, Minn.. June 27.
1975).
167. Plaintiff's Complaint, McBurney v. Loris, No. 14411 (Dist. Ct., Carver
County, Minn., June 27, 1975) (complaint filed July 26, 1973).

MINNESOTA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 62:163

ment of [Christmas Lake] by the plaintiffs ..
."I"
". He therefore
ordered the defendants to adopt corrective measures.' 9
Although the judge's order mentioned MERA briefly, he justified
his decision primarily by reference to nuisance law.'70 The attorneys
believe that the outcome was not affected by the MERA count.'"
5.

State ex rel. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v.
Kjellberg Dayton Mobile Home Park'

The Minnesota Public Interest Research Group (MPIRG), a student organization,' brought suit against the owner and operator of
168. McBurney v. Loris, No. 14411 (Dist. Ct., Carver County, Minn., June 27,
1975).
169. The court ordered the defendants to fence the pasture area, to refrain from
overgrazing the pasture, and to curtail the outside pasturing of horses during the
winter. Id.
170. Id.
171. Haik Interview, supra note 165; Schmithuber Interview, supra note 165.
172. This case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents
on file at the district courts, State v. Kjellberg's Dayton Park, Inc., No. 723398 (Dist.
Ct., Hennepin County, Minn., Apr. 27, 1977) (complaint filed Mar. 5, 1976); Kiellberg's Dayton Park, Inc. v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, No. 409303 (Dist. Ct.,
Ramsey County, Minn., filed Jan. 15, 1976); State ex rel. Minnesota Pub. Interest
Research Group v. Kjellberg Dayton Mobile Home Park, No. 703475 (Dist. Ct., Hennepin County, Minn., filed Apr. 13, 1974); Kjellberg Mobile Home Park, Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency (Aug. 12, 1975) (unpublished administrative decision); Kiellberg (Dayton) Mobile Home Park, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (Jan. 21, 1975)
(unpublished administrative decision); George Hedlund, Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency (Apr. 13, 1970) (unpublished administrative decision) (unpublished administrative decisions are on file at Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Division of Water
Quality, Roseville, Minnesota); Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Chronology of
Events Concerning the Dayton Kjellberg Mobile Home Park, Dayton Township, Hennepin County (Apr. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Dayton Park Chronology] (unpublished report on file at Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Division of Water Quality,
Roseville, Minnesota); Telephone Interview with John T. Cardell, Attorney for Defendant (Aug. 6, 1976); Interview with James Early, Attorney for the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency, in Roseville, Minnesota (Aug. 6, 1976); Interview with Abner Fisch,
Division of Water Quality, Section on Municipal Facilities, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, in Roseville, Minnesota (Aug. 9,1976); Telephone Interview with Thomas
Idstrom, President of Concerned Citizens of Dayton (Aug. 4, 1976); Telephone Interview with Jon Jesvold, Attorney for Plaintiffs (Sept. 15, 1976); Telephone Interview
with Tom Newberry, "Community Organizer" for the Minnesota Public Interest
Research Group (Aug. 5, 1976); Telephone Interviews with Tim Scherkenbach, Division of Water Quality, Section of Compliance and Enforcement, Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency (Aug. 11, 1976 & June 30, 1977); Interview with Dale Wikre, Staff
Geologist of the Division of Water Quality, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, in
Roseville, Minnesota (Aug. 9, 1976).
173. The Minnesota Public Interest Research Group is a statewide organization
engaged in research, lobbying activities, and litigation concerning "public interest"
issues such as the environment, consumer protection, and housing. Supported by
$160,000 a year in collections from fifteen Minnesota college campuses, MPIRG em-
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a suburban mobile home park (MHIP). Sewage effluent from the
MHP, after being treated at the park's own facility, was discharged
into a lake whose waters eventually merge with the Mississippi River
above Minneapolis. In 1959, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
had approved plans for a private sewage treatment system designed
to serve the 100 units in the park. 7 ' In 1963, however, the PCA, in
order to maintain a level of water quality suitable for drinking in the
metropolitan area, adopted a regulation (WPC 1) prohibiting discharge of any effluent, however well treated, into the portion of the
Mississippi that eventually received the MHP's discharge.7 5 For
about seven years, the MHP violated this regulation without requesting a variance. Furthermore, between 1966 and 1970, the number of
mobile homes in the MHP increased to 240, without a corresponding
increase in the capacity of the treatment facility. By 1974, the discharge of the sewage works had increased to 33,000 gallons per day,
while the capacity of the plant was only 26,000 gallons per day.' This
problem had been exacerbated by substandard operation and maintenance procedures. According to complaining residents of the area,
the effluent was unsightly and odoriferous and was contributing to
the growth of algae in the lake.'
Instead of attempting to shut down Kjellberg's operation, the
PCA engaged in a lengthy and apparently futile effort to negotiate a
mutually satisfactory sewage disposal plan, involving several proposals and counterproposals from the Agency, Kjellberg's, the Metropolitan Council, and the Town of Dayton. 7 In 1970, Kjellberg's received
a variance from the requirements of WPC 1, subject to various conditions, including a requirement that the owner submit plans for enlarged treatment facilities, which after being constructed were to be
owned by the town. 71 Rather than resolving the problem, the variance generated another series of negotiations, culminating in Kjellploys full-time researchers, attorneys, and community organizers who solicit and manage student volunteer participation in a variety of projects. Minneapolis Tribune, May
14, 1977, § A, at 14, col. 1.
174. George Hedlund, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (Apr. 13, 1970) (unpublished administrative decision on file at Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Division of Water Quality, Roseville, Minnesota).
175. MiNN. REG. WPC 1 (1977) (to be codified in 6 MIN. CODE AGE.CY RULM §
4.8001).
176. Plaintiff's Complaint, State ex rel. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research
Group v. Kjellberg Dayton Mobile Home Park, No. 703475 (Dist. Ct., Hennepin
County, Minn., filed Apr. 13, 1974).
177. See Minneapolis Star, Nov. 26, 1974, § B, at 1, col. 1.
178. See Dayton Park Chronology, supra note 172, at 1-4.
179. George Hedlund, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, slip op. at 3 (Apr.
13, 1970) (unpublished administrative decision on file at Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency, Division of Water Quality, Roseville, Minnesota).
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berg's formal request for PCA approval of a plan to dispose of the
effluent through a spray system."'"
Meanwhile, MPIRG had organized several "citizen action
groups" throughout the state to deal with local consumer and environmental issues. For a certain annual fee, MPIRG agreed to put the
resources of its staff at each group's disposal.'' One such group, the
Concerned Citizens of Dayton (CCD), began to urge the PCA Board
to stop Kjellberg's pollution. Dissatisfied with the slow rate of progress, CCD and MPIRG brought suit under MERA,' 2 alleging that
MHP's pollution violated an "environmental quality standard.""',
Before the trial began, the PCA's staff apparently persuaded the
plaintiffs to abandon their suit on the ground that pending PCA
hearings would resolve the controversy."'4 The CCD and MPIRG subsequently became parties to these hearings, which resulted in revocation of Kjellberg's variance, the revocation being stayed for one year
pending compliance with several conditions designed to improve the
treatment process.' 5 The spray irrigation proposal was rejected.
After Kjellberg failed to comply with the conditions of this and
other orders, the PCA instituted an action without a Rights Act count
to enforce its orders and regulations."'" This action seems to have
resolved the dispute."'7 Kjellberg agreed by stipulation to pay $8,000
180. See Dayton Park Chronology, supra note 172, at 4-12.
181. Newberry Interview, supra note 172.
182. Plaintiff's Complaint, State ex rel. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research
Group v. Kjellberg Dayton Mobile Home Park, No. 703475 (Dist. Ct., Hennepin
County, Minn., filed Apr. 13, 1974).
183. MINN. STAT. § 116B.02(5) (1976) defines "pollution, impairment or destruction" to include any conduct that "violates, or is likely to violate, any environmental
quality standard."
184. Scherkenbach Interview, supra note 172.
185. See Kjellberg (Dayton) Mobile Home Park, Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency (Jan. 21, 1975) (unpublished administrative decision on file at Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency, Division of Water Quality, Roseville, Minnesota). Kjellberg
subsequently petitioned for judicial review of these proceedings. Kjellberg's Dayton
Park, Inc. v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, No. 409303 (Dist. Ct., Ramsey
County, Minn., filed Jan. 15, 1976). This action was dismissed, however, by the parties' stipulation concluding the PCA's suit against Kjellberg's mobile home park seeking compliance with the PCA's various orders. See sources cited at notes 187-88 infra.
186. The enforcement action instituted by the PCA alleged violations of PCA
orders entered on April 13, 1970, January 21, 1975, and October 7, 1975. Plaintiff's
Complaint at 3, State v. Kjellberg's Dayton Park, Inc., No. 723398 (Dist. Ct., Hennepin County, Minn., Apr. 27, 1977) (complaint filed Mar. 5, 1976).
187. Stipulation, State v. Kjellberg's Dayton Park, Inc., No. 723398 (Dist. Ct.,
Hennepin County, Minn., Apr. 27, 1977) (stipulation filed Apr. 26, 1977); Stipulation
of Dismissal, Kjellberg's Dayton Park, Inc. v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency,
No. 409303 (Dist. Ct., Ramsey County, Minn., filed Jan. 15, 1976) (stipulation of dismissal filed Apr. 26, 1977).
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in civil penalties and litigation expenses and to construct a sewage
treatment facility that complies with the PCA's requirements. ' "
B.

AIt POLLUTION

Three MERA cases involved air pollution."' In the first of these,
water pollution was also an apparently secondary issue.
9
1. Anderson v. Kiecker' '

Kiecker was a farmer who owned a tract of land bordering on a
5,670-acre lake.' 9' Although he had originally bought the land as an
investment, he later decided to let relatives use it as a pig farm"' and
applied to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency for a feedlot permit. The proposed feedlot was to be located 1,200 feet from the lake.'" =
The surrounding area was unzoned and was devoted to a mixture of
agricultural and residential uses. The plaintiffs, owners of nearby
homes, opposed this project, evidently because they expected it to
create offensive odors."' While the feedlot application was pending
at the PCA, they sued Kiecker, basing their complaint on MERA,'1"
PCA air pollution'9 ' and solid waste disposal regulations,"' the state
188. State v. Kjellberg's Dayton Park, Inc., No. 723398 (Dist. Ct., Hennepin
County, Minn., Apr. 27, 1977); Scherkenbach Interview (June 30, 1977), supra note
172.
189. There have been no unsuccessful cases under MERA in which air pollution
was a major ground of complaint.
190. This case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents
on file at the district court, Anderson v. Kiecker, No. 30890 (Dist. Ct., Otter Tail
County, Minn., filed Aug. 7, 1975); Telephone Interview with William King, Regional
Officer for the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (Aug. 6, 1976); Telephone Interviews with Stephen Van Drake, Attorney for Plaintiff Anderson (July 23, Aug. 4, &
Oct. 26, 1976).
191. The lake is West Battle Lake, near the city of Battle Lake, in Otter Tail
County. See generally MiNNFsoTA's LAKESHORE, supra note 137, at 48.
192. Van Drake Interviews, supra note 190.
193. King Interview, supra note 190.
194. The plaintiffs also alleged that runoff from the feedlot would pollute the
lake. Plaintiff's Complaint at 5, Anderson v. Kiecker, No. 30890 (Dist. Ct., Otter
Tail County, Minn., filed Aug. 7, 1975); Van Drake Interviews, supra note 190.
195. The complaint stated that if the "feedlot permit were granted, the effect of
said action would materially and adversely affect ... the environment of the County
of Otter Tail. .

. ."

Plaintiff's Complaint at 3, Anderson v. Kiecker, No. 30890 (Dist.

Ct., Otter Tail County, Minn., filed Aug. 7, 1975). See generally MtNN. STAT.
§§ 116B.02(5), .03(1) (1976).
196. Plaintiff's Complaint at 5, Anderson v. Kiecker, No. 30890 (Dist. Ct., Otter
Tail County, Minn., filed Aug. 7, 1975) (citing MINN. REG. APC 9, 10 (1976) (to be
codified in 6 MiNN.CODE AGFcY RULES §§ 4.0009, 4.0010)).
197. Id. at 3-4 (citing MINN. REG. SW 51(7), (19), 52(2), (4), 53(3), (4), 54(1),
(2)(b), (d), (e)(1976) (to be codified in 6 MiNN.CODE AGE'cy Rutns §§ 4.6051(7), (19),
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Environmental Policy Act,'"" the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act,5 9 and nuisance law. 2°°
The PCA supported Kiecker, observing that the feedlot would be
over one-half mile from the nearest concentration of ten dwellings as
required by their regulations and concluding that no harmful runoff
20
would reach the lake. 1
The trial judge granted an ex parte temporary restraining order
enjoining the PCA from granting a permit and set a date for a hearing
on the temporary injunction. 02 Thereafter, the defendant, who had
previously denied the allegations of the complaint without the assistance of counsel, withdrew his application for a permit. According to
the plaintiffs' attorney, "[ilt boiled down to the fact that he wanted
to be a good neighbor. He hadn't anticipated that he would make so
23
many enemies.1
As a compromise, the neighbors agreed that the land could be
used to pasture and feed cattle. 04 Whatever the environmental merits
of this alternative may have been, it seems reasonably clear that
MERA was not essential to the outcome. Because the defendant
abandoned his plans in order to avoid a dispute with his neighbors,
the plaintiffs' attorney believes that the other counts in the complaint would have produced the same result." 5 Not having retained
counsel, Kiecker presumably made his decision without reference to
the legal arguments. In any event, it would have been difficult for the
plaintiffs to prevail on the MERA count, given the statute's exemption of noxious odors0 0 and farm operations ' from the reach of the
Act.
.6052(2), (4), .6053(3), (4), .6054(1), (2)(b), (d), (e))).
198. Id. at 5-6 (citing MINN. STAT. § 116D.02 (1976)).
199. Id. at 6-7 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970)).
200. Id. at 5.
201. The PCA's regional officer informed Kiecker that no variance would be
required. King Interview, supra note 190.
202. Anderson v. Kiecker, No. 30890 (Dist. Ct., Otter Tail County, Minn., Aug.
16, 1975) (granting temporary restraining order).
203. Van Drake Interviews, supra note 190.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. MINN. STAT. § 116B.02(5) (1976) provides that "[piollution, impairment or
destruction . . .shall not include conduct which violates, or is likely to violate, any
such standard, limitation, regulation, rules, order, license, stipulation agreement or
permit solely because of the introduction of an odor into the air."
207. Id. § 116B.02(2). See County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 243 N.W.2d 316, 31920 (Minn. 1976), discussed at notes 349-53 infra and accompanying text; note 95
supra.
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State v. Frost Paint & Oil Co.",

The defendant's plant, located in Minneapolis, had been discharging some of its wastes into the city's combined sanitary and
storm sewer system. The sewer's effluent was apparently influenced
by some kind of negative pressure that caused the flow to back up
and form ponds within the sewer line.20 As a result, odors from the
accumulating chemicals occasionally escaped through manholes and
storm drains of the community sewer system, and residents of the
area complained that odors were released through their sink drains
and toilets. 10
Frost never admitted that its activities had caused the odors. " '
Nevertheless, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency decided to
bring suit against the company. The complaint was framed essentially around alleged violations of the PCA's odor regulations," 2
which, if proved, would constitute an enjoinable public nuisance irrespective of MERA.2 1 3 However, the PCA also added two counts
based on MERA.2 11 Although MERA does not permit suits based on
conduct that violates a regulation solely by "the introduction of odor
into the air, 21 the complaint avoided the exemption by alleging that
the vapors created by Frost had caused choking, headaches, and
nausea, thus constituting a "material adverse effect" on the
"human" environment.2 16 The other Rights Act count charged that
208. This case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents
on file with the district court, State v. Frost Paint & Oil Co., No. 708702 (Dist. Ct.,
Hennepin County, Minn., Mar. 31, 1976) (complaint filed Nov. 18, 1974); Interview
with John Bonner, Jr., Attorney for Defendant Frost Paint, in Minneapolis (Aug. 12,
1976); Telephone Interview with James Early, Attorney for Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (July 22, 1976).
209. Bonner Interview, supra note 208.
210. Plaintiff's Complaint, State v. Frost Paint & Oil Co., No. 708702 (Dist.
Ct., Hennepin County, Minn., Mar. 31, 1976) (complaint filed Nov. 18, 1974); Bonner
Interview, supra note 208.
211. Frost's attorney stated that it was his client's "suspicion that the sewer flow
was interrupted by the construction of [a] nearby [interstate highway). There was
never any complaint about the odors . . . until [the highway] was constructed."
Bonner Interview, supra note 208.
212. Plaintiff's Complaint, State v. Frost Paint & Oil Co., No. 708702 (Dist.
Ct., Hennepin County, Minn., Mar. 31, 1976) (complaint filed Nov. 18, 1974) (citing
MINN. REG. APC 9 (1976) (to be codified in 6 Mm. CODE AGEscy RuLsS § 4.0009)).
APC 9 regulates the allowable concentrations of odor at varying distances from the
source.
213. See MN. STAT. § 115.071(4) (1976) (authorizing injunctions against violators of the PCA's pollution regulations); text accompanying notes 148-49 supra.
214. Plaintiff's Complaint, State v. Frost Paint & Oil Co., No. 708702 (Dist. Ct.,
Hennepin County, Minn., Mar. 31, 1976) (complaint filed Nov. 18, 1974).
215. Mnm. STAT. § 116B.02(5) (1976).
216. Plaintiff's Complaint, State v. Frost Paint & Oil Co., No. 708702 (Dist.
Ct., Hennepin County, Minn., Mar. 31, 1976) (complaint filed Nov. 18, 1974); Early
Interview, supranote 208.
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Frost's practice violated a Metropolitan Sewer Board regulation forbidding disposal into the metropolitan sewer system of substances
2 '
likely to violate an "environmental quality standard.""
During the course of the litigation, the defendant's engineers
discovered that the problems could be alleviated by diverting Frost's
effluent to another sewer." ' This was done, and thereafter the parties
stipulated to an injunction that forbade the previous disposal method
and required the company to comply with applicable PCA regulations."1 9 The court's accompanying memorandum did not mention
MERA,O and attorneys for both sides agree that it did not affect the
2
outcome. '
3.

Interest Research Group v.
State ex rel. Minnesota Public
2
North Star Chemicals, Inc.

The defendants in this case were a petroleum refiner and two
chemical manufacturers located on a 100-acre site near Pine Bend,
Minnesota, just southeast of the Twin Cities. This is the largest
petrochemical complex in the state, and its wastes cause three types
of pollution.2 3 The most visible and controversial problem is the air
pollution created by the sometimes enormous plumes of white and
black smoke from the emission stacks.2 A second source of pollution
217. Plaintiffs Complaint, State v. Frost Paint & Oil Co., No. 708702 (Dist. Ct.,
Hennepin County, Minn., Mar. 31, 1976) (complaint filed Nov. 18, 1974) (citing Metro.
politan Sewer Board Sewage and Waste Control Rules and Regulations for Metropolitan Disposal System § 5-4(e)).
218. Bonner Interview, supra note 208.
219. State v. Frost Paint & Oil Co., No. 708702 (Dist. Ct., Hennepin County,
Minn., Mar. 31, 1976).
220. Id.
221. Indeed, neither side pursued the MERA theories. Bonner Interview, supra
note 208; Early Interview, supra note 208.
222. This case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents
on file at the district court, State ex rel. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v.
North Star Chems., Inc., Nos. 74270, 74333 (Dist. Ct., Dakota County, Minn., filed
June 27, 1972); Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, The Role of the Pollution
Control Agency in the Pollution of Groundwater at Pine Bend: A Report to the PCA
Board (June 6, 1972) [hereinafter cited as MPIRG Groundwater Report) (unpublished report on file at Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, Minneapolis, Minnesota); Interview with Charles Dayton, Attorney for Plaintiff Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, in Minneapolis (July 27, 1976); Telephone Interview with Kenneth Green, Attorney for Defendant Koch Refining Co. (Sept. 8, 1976); Interview with
Will Hartfeldt, Attorney for Plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Savage, in St. Paul (July
28, 1976); Telephone Interview with Edward Schwartzbauer, Attorney for Defendant
North Star Chemicals, Inc. (Sept. 8,1976).
223. See MPIRG Groundwater Report, supra note 222, at 1.
224. See Defendants' Motions, Exhibit A (Chronological Resume of Pollution
Control Efforts of St. Paul Ammonia Products and Its Contacts with the Minnesota
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has been the discharge of the plants' wastewater effluent into the
Mississippi River."- The final problem is seepage of the plants' liquid
wastes from temporary holding ponds into the groundwater, allegedly
contaminating it. 5 Prior to the lawsuit, all three companies had been
negotiating agreements with the Pollution Control Agency concerning
pollution-abatement measures.m
MPIRG's coplaintiffs were a citizens' group called Clean Air
Clean Water Unlimited, the owners of the Pine Bend Ski Area, and
other nearby residents. Their MERA claim alleged that each of the
defendants was violating several of the PCA's air and water pollution
control regulations and thereby adversely affecting the environment.2 In addition, the plaintiffs asserted causes of action in nuisance, trespass, and negligence.3 After preliminary motions,3 1 the
plaintiffs surprised the defendants by asking the court to remit the
case to the PCA,2 retaining jurisdiction for possible future proceedings. While this motion was pending, stipulation agreements concerning air pollution control were entered into between the PCA and all
Pollution Control Agency) [hereinafter cited as Chronological Resume] & Exhibit B
at 1-2 (Report on Pine Bend Companies' Compliance Programs, July 1972) [hereinafter cited asCompliance Report], State ex reL Minnesota Pub. Interest Research
Group v. North Star Chems., Inc., Nos. 74270,74333 (Dist. Ct., Dakota County, Minn.,
filed June 27, 1972); St. Paul Dispatch, June 8, 1972, at 1, col. 3; id., July 14, 1971, at
1, col. 2.
225. MPIRG Groundwater Report, supra note 222, at 1.
226. Id.
227. See Transcript of Hearing (Aug. 25, 1972), State ex reL Minnesota Pub.
Interest Research Group v. North Star Chems., Inc., Nos. 74270, 74333 (Dist. Ct.,
Dakota County, Minn., filed June 27, 1972) (on file at Dakota County District Court,
Hastings, Minnesota); Compliance Report, supra note 224.
228. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged violations of MINN. Pr. APC 1, 9, 15,
WPC 14(d)(1) (1976) (to be codified in 6 Mms. CODE AoNc'y RULs §§ 4.0001, .0009,
.0015, .8014(d)(1)). Plaintiffs' Complaint, State ex reL. Minnesota Pub. Interest Re.
search Group v. North Star Chems., Inc., Nos. 74270, 74333 (Dist. Ct., Dakota County,
Minn., filed June 27, 1972).
229. MiNN. STAT. § 116B.03(1) (1976) creates a cause of action for conduct causing "pollution, impairment, or destruction" of natural resources. Such conduct specifically includes the violation of pollution regulations. Id. § 116B.02(5).
230. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, State ex reL Minnesota Pub. Interest Re.
search Group v. North Star Chems., Inc., Nos. 74270,74333 (Dist. Ct., Dakota County,
Minn., filed June 27, 1972) (amended complaint filed Aug. 4, 1972).
231. These motions, on behalf of defendants, sought to stay all discovery until
the preliminary hearing and to sever and strike certain claims. Defendants' Motions,
State ex rel. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. North Star Chems., Inc., Nos.
74270, 74333 (Dist. Ct., Dakota County, Minn., filed June 27, 1972).
232. Motion for Remittitur, State ex rel. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research
Group v. North Star Chems., Inc., Nos. 74270,74333 (Dist. Ct., Dakota County, Minn.,
filed June 27, 1972) (motion for remittitur filed Aug. 23, 1972); Dayton Interview, supra
note 222.
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but one of the defendants."' Thereafter, the parties agreed to a dismissal of the lawsuit without prejudice. 34
The plaintiffs' attorneys have concluded that the lawsuit did not
greatly change the terms of the stipulation agreements. They believe,
however, that the suit expedited negotiations by providing the companies with an incentive to obtain the stamp of legitimacy that PCA
approval of their abatement plans would confer. 33 It is unclear
whether, absent the MERA claims, the common law counts would
have served this purpose as well.
C.

LAND USE: ALTERATIONS OF LAKES

Land use disputes generated fourteen of the 26 MERA cases that
were resolved during the study period. Of the seven successful land
use suits,216 four involved alterations of lakes.
3
1. State ex rel. Tabaka v. Board of Supervisors

Green owned an undeveloped peninsulas on Woman Lake in
Cass County and a sliver of the adjacent mainland. Although most
of the peninsula was only about two to four feet wide, its tip, comprising about seven and one-half acres, was bulbous and therefore developable. Green had plans to subdivide it and sell lots to the public.
To provide access to these lots, he would need a road, and so he filed
a petition 39 under the cartway statute, which provides:
233. Dayton Interview, supra note 222; Green Interview, supra note 222; Hartfeldt Interview, supra note 222; Schwartzbauer Interview, supra note 222.
234. The claims of MPIRG and Clean Air Clean Water Unlimited were formally
dismissed without prejudice on June 25, 1976, whereas the damage action brought by
the Savages was dismissed with prejudice on July 1, 1976. State ex rel. Minnesota Pub.
Interest Research Group v. North Star Chems., Inc., Nos. 74270, 74333 (Dist. Ct.,
Dakota County, Minn., filed June 27, 1972).
235. Dayton Interview, supra note 222; Hartfeldt Interview, supra note 222.
236. Of the seven unsuccessful land use suits, one concerned the drainage of
marshland in rural areas, two involved the preservation of historic sites, and four
sought to prevent planned construction. A final, unrelated MERA action concerned
an issue of energy policy. These cases are discussed in the Appendix at pp. 223-28 infra.
237. This case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents
on file at the district court, State ex rel. Tabaka v. Board of Supervisors, No. 20124
(Dist. Ct., Cass County, Minn., filed Oct. 4, 1974); Telephone Interview with Wilbert
Hendricks, Attorney for the Defendant Board (Oct. 26, 1976); Telephone Interview
with Harlan Smith, Attorney for Defendant Green (Aug. 9, 1976); Interview with
Arthur Walsh, Attorney for Plaintiff Tabaka, in Minneapolis (July 26, 1976); Telephone Interview with Arthur Walsh, Attorney for Plaintiff Tabaka (Oct. 26, 1976).
238. The parties could not agree whether the land Green sought to develop was
a peninsula or an island. Smith Interview, supra note 237; Walsh Interviews, supra
note 237.
239. A copy of the petition was attached to plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff's
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[UL]pon petition presented to the town board by the owner of a tract
of land containing at least five acres, who has no access thereto
except over the lands of others, the town board by resolution shall
establish a cartway at least two rods wide connecting the petitioner's
land with a public road. . . .[D]amages, if any, shall be paid by
the petitioner to the town before such cartway is opened."*
The area in question is part of what is known locally as the "Gold
Coast," the wealthiest portion of Cass County.24' Unfortunately,
Green's relations with the neighbors over whose land the cartway
would pass were strained. They were millionaires, whose homes one
observer described as "virtually castles on the lake,""2 2 and they were
apprehensive that Green's development would spoil the atmosphere
of their beautiful enclave. One of them tried unsuccessfully to outbid
Green at the probate sale when he acquired the land, and subsequent
efforts to induce him to sell were equally unavailing.2 3 While the
cartway petition was still pending before the Board, Green's neighbors sued him and the Board to enjoin the project.1' One count,
relying on MERA, alleged that the dumping of "literally thousands
of cubic yards of fill. . . into Woman Lake" that would be necessary
to make the isthmus wide enough for a road would cause various sorts
of ecological damage and that on the mainland the cartway would
"necessarily result in the displacement and destruction along its
route of considerable wooded acreage."2 5 A second count asserted
that the requisite filling along the isthmus would be illegal without a
2
permit from the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources. '
Other counts requested an environmental impact statement and contended that there was no public purpose or necessity for the cart247
way.
Complaint, Exhibit B, State ex rel. Tabaka v. Board of Supervisors, No. 20124 (Dist.
Ct., Cass County, Minn., filed Oct. 4, 1974).
240. MwN. STAT. § 164.08(2) (1976). A "cartway" is simply a dirt road. Theoretically, the petitioner pays only the damages to the landowners whose property is traversed by the road, but since, despite the mandatory language of the statute, the
petitions are sometimes denied because of a lack of money, the petitioner's offer to pay
the initial expense of constructing the road helps to induce the board to approve the
request. Hendricks Interview, supra note 237; Walsh Interview (Oct. 26, 1976), supra
note 237.
241. Hendricks Interview, supra note 237; Walsh Interviews, supra note 237.
242. Walsh Interview (Oct. 26, 1976), supra note 237.
243. Walsh Interviews, supra note 237.
244. State ex reL Tabaka v. Board of Supervisors, No. 20124 (Dist. Ct., Cass
County, Minn., filed Oct. 4, 1974).
245. Plaintiff's Complaint at 2-3, State ex reL Tabaka v. Board of Supervisors,
No. 20124 (Dist. Ct., Cass County, Minn., filed Oct. 4, 1974).
246. Id. at 4-6.
247. Id. at 6.
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While the action was pending, Green concluded that, regardless
of the outcome of the lawsuit, his influential opponents would prevail
before the Board and that litigation to reverse this anticipated decision would be too expensive." 8 He therefore withdrew his petition,
and the case was dismissed without prejudice."'
The attorneys for both sides believe that the same result would
have been achieved without the MERA count.2 0
2. In re Cron"'
Under Minnesota law, a permit from the Department of Natural
Resources (DNR) is necessary for activities, such as dredging, filling,
or damming, that affect the "course, current or cross-section of any
public waters."" 2 Failure to obtain the permit is a misdemeanor; 3
but the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that in order to obtain a
conviction the state must prove that the project had harmful consequences, reasoning that otherwise the statute might be unconstitutionally vague.2 4
Cron, who lived on Lake Vermillion, a large, beautiful, and popular lake in northern Minnesota, owned a U-shaped dock abutting his
shoreland property. In 1974 he decided to repair the dock and build
a new boathouse. Without having obtained a permit,2 3he dismantled
the old boathouse and began to reconstruct the dock.
When the project was interrupted by a game warden, Cron applied to the DNR for the requisite permit. The DNR granted a permit
for the work on the dock, but refused to authorize an attached boathouse.2 Cron appealed to the local district court, asserting that the
248. Walsh Interviews, supra note 237.
249. Id.
250. Hendricks Interview, supra note 237; Smith Interview, supra note 237;
Walsh Interviews, supra note 237.
251. This case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents
on file with the district court, In re Cron, No. 18451 (Dist. Ct., St. Louis County,
Minn., July 27, 1976) (complaint filed Apr. 27, 1975); Telephone Interview with Don
Paquette, Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Natural Resources (Nov.
5, 1975).

252.

MINN. STAT.

§ 105.42(1) (1976).

253. Id. § 105.541(1).
254. See State v. Kuluvar, 266 Minn. 408, 123 N.W.2d 699 (1963). Although the
statute literally applies to such trivial activities as throwing a rock into a lake, common
sense compels the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to cover such alterations of the cross-sections of public waters.
255. The petitioner claimed that he sought the advice of the Department of
Natural Resources prior to construction of the dock, but received no response. See Brief
for Petitioner at 2, In re Cron, No. 18451 (Dist. Ct., St. Louis County, Minn., July 27,
1976) (complaint filed Apr. 27, 1975).
256. Id. at 3; Brief for Respondent at 1, In re Cron, No. 18451 (Dist. Ct., St. Louis
County, Minn., July 27, 1976) (complaint filed Apr. 27, 1975).
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proposed boathouse would be attractive, that boathouses were common in the area, and that his immediate neighbors approved his
proposal."' The DNR answered by stating that it was the Department's policy, and that of the county, to phase out existing on-water
boathouses on Lake Vermillion. Since 1947 the Department had issued only five permits for such structures, and then only because
suitable alternatives did not exist.' In Cron's case, however, the
DNR believed that either an on-land boathouse or a temporary shore
stationo would be a feasible alternative, the latter being favored as
less aesthetically obtrusive. 6 ' Citing the permit statute, the Department argued that MERA, as subsequent legislation, demonstrated
that aesthetic impacts were to be weighed when evaluating permit
applications.2 1 The state's attorney also stressed that the DNR's
boathouse policy was analogous to treatment of nonconforming uses
in zoning law.26 2 Finally, he invoked the substantial evidence test as
another reason for upholding denial of the permit. m
The trial judge upheld the DNR's decision.21 After stating that
the substantial evidence test should be applied, he relied on MERA,
concluding that there was "relevant evidence of a substantial nature"
that the boathouse would have a material adverse effect on "aesthetic
resources" owned by the state,25 and that there were "feasible and
prudent alternatives" to Cron's proposal21 Conceding that this deci257. Brief for Petitioner at 3, In re Cron, No. 18451 (Dist. Ct., St. Louis County,
Minn., July 27, 1976) (complaint filed Apr. 27, 1975).
258. Brief for Respondent at 3, 9, In re Cron, No. 18451 (Dist. Ct., St. Louis
County, Minn., July 27, 1976) (complaint filed Apr. 27, 1975).
259. A temporary shore station is simply a boat house or storage structure that
can be removed at the end of the summer boating season.
260. See Brief for Respondent at 10, In re Cron, No. 18451 (Dist. Ct., St. Louis
County, Minn., July 27, 1976) (complaint filed Apr. 27, 1975). Cron argued that a
temporary shore station would be less attractive and durable than his proposed boathouse. Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, In re Cron, No. 18451 (Dist. Ct., St. Louis County,
Minn., July 27, 1976) (complaint filed Apr. 27, 1975).
261. See Brief for Respondent at 4-6, In re Cron, No. 18451 (Dist. Ct., St. Louis
County, Minn., July 27, 1976) (complaint filed Apr. 27, 1975) (citing MINN. STAT.
§ 105.42(1) (1976) (enacted in 1947), and id. § 116B.02(4) (enacted in 1971)).
262. Id. at 8 (citing County of Freeborn v. Clausen, 295 Minn. 96,99, 203 N.W.2d
323, 327 (1972), and Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281
Minn. 492, 500, 162 N.W.2d 206, 213 (1968)).
263. Id. (citing Minneapolis Van & Warehouse Co. v. St. Paul Terminal Warehouse Co., 288 Minn. 294, 298-99, 180 N.W.2d 175, 177-78 (1970), and MtNN. STAT. §
105.47 (1976)). See generally note 13 supra and accompanying text.
264. In re Cron, No. 18451 (Dist. Ct., St. Louis County, Minn., July 27, 1976).
265. Id., slip op. at2 (citing MiNN. STAT. § 116B.02(4) (1976)). See generally note
13 supra and accompanying text.
266. In re Cron, No. 18451, slip op. at 2 (Dist. Ct., St. Louis County, Minn., July
27, 1976) (citing MaN. STAT. § 116B.04 (1976)).
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sion might cause some economic hardship to Cron, the court relied
on MERA as authority for the proposition that "economic considerations alone" do not justify environmental degradation." 7
Although the court's language suggests otherwise, the DNR's
lawyer believes that MERA was not necessary to the decision and
that the limited scope of review of administrative decisions would
have produced the same result. 8 Since denials of these permits have
rarely been based on aesthetic grounds, the paucity of analogous preMERA cases makes his conclusion necessarily speculative., On the
other hand, the DNR's policy concerning boathouses on Lake Vermillion did antedate the Rights Act,"' so that the administrative decision, if not the judicial one, would probably have been the same
without it.
3.

Congdon v. Metropolitan Council m'

The Metropolitan Council drafted a comprehensive plan for the
collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area. 2 One objective of this plan was to eliminate septic
tank drainfield systems around Lake Minnetonka, a large, important
lake west of the Twin Cities. As part of this project, a sewage interceptor 73 was constructed in the town of Shorewood, near Mary
Lake.?'
267. The trial judge also cited the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act, MINN.
§ 116D.04 (1976), which reiterates language from the Rights Act, id. § 116B.04.
In re Cron, No. 18451, slip op. at 4 (Dist. Ct., St. Louis County, Minn., July 27, 1976).
268. Paquette Interview, supra note 251. See generally note 13 supra and accompanying text.
269. The only case interpreting MINN. STAT. § 105.42 (1976), prior to the enactment of MERA in 1971, was State v. Kuluvar, 266 Minn. 408, 123 N.W.2d 699 (1963).
270. See Brief for Respondent at 9, In re Cron, No. 18451 (Dist. Ct., St. Louis
County, Minn., July 27, 1976) (complaint filed Apr. 27, 1975).
271. This case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents
on file with the district court, Congdon v. Metropolitan Council, No. 703339 (Dist. Ct..
Hennepin County, Minn., filed Mar. 3, 1974); Telephone Interview with Thomas Hay,
Attorney for Defendants Metropolitan Council and Metropolitan Sewer Board (Aug.
16, 1976); Telephone Interview with Jon Jesvold, Attorney for Plaintiff Minnesota
Public Interest Research Group (Sept. 15, 1976); Telephone Interview with Robert
Junghans, Attorney for Defendant Engineers (Aug. 16, 1976); Telephone Interview
with William F. Kelley, Attorney for Defendant City of Shorewood (Aug. 17, 1976);
Telephone Interview with Lee H. May, Attorney for Plaintiffs Congdon and May (Oct.
25, 1976).
272. Under the provisions of its enabling legislation, the Metropolitan Council
was directed to prepare and adopt a comprehensive plan for the collection, treatment,
and disposal of sewage in the metropolitan area. MINN. STAT. §§ 473B.06(5a),
473C.06(3) (1974) (current version at MINN. STAT. §§ 473.146, .513 (1976)).
273. A sewage interceptor is an underground conduit necessary for the collection
and disposal of sewage waste.
274. The sewage interceptor was built according to plans filed with and approved
STAT.
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Two riparian landowners on the latter lake brought suit, "5 contending that the interceptor had lowered the level of the lake. By
constructing the pipelines too close to the lake, the defendants had
allegedly caused the water to pierce the bottom shell of the lake and
drain into and along the ditch that had been built for the interceptor."' The complaint stated several causes of action. One count called
for an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Actm on the ground that the town had obtained federal
funds for the project. Another count, based on MERA, claimed that
by lowering the water level the defendants had disrupted the ecology
of the shoreline. Other counts relied on theories of trespass and nuisance. The individual plaintiffs sought damages of $10,000 as compensation for diminution of the value of their land. 9
The defendants denied that the interceptor had lowered the
lake's level, 279 but a year later the case was settled, with the
defendant-engineers agreeing to construct a deep well capable of
pumping fifty gallons of water per minute into Mary Lake to raise its
water level.2 Each of the other defendants (except the town) agreed
to pay the individual plaintiffs jointly $1,000.2' The defendants, according to their attorneys, decided that litigation would cost $30,000$40,000, and "no one was going to spend that kind of money to prove
a point."s One of these attorneys also contends that the case "dealt
with property values" and that MERA "played no part at all." M
Another says that the case was "really a nuisance case."' Even so,
a third defense attorney observes that the case helped to create a
"heightened awareness" among government officials of the problem
of lakebed seepage into pipeline channels,"' and the plaintiffs'
attorney believes that the Rights Act was "instrumental" in achieving the favorable settlement.26
by the Metropolitan Council pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 473C.06(3) (1974) (current
version at MnN. STAT. § 473.513 (1976)).
275. Although the Minnesota Public Interest Research Group initially joined the
landowners as a coplaintiff, it did not thereafter actively participate in the case.
276. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 7, Congdon v. Metropolitan Council, No.
703339 (Dist. Ct., Hennepin County, Minn., filed Mar. 3, 1974).
277. Id. at 5-6 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1970)).

278. Id. at 8.
279. Hay Interview, supra note 271; Junghans Interview, supra note 271; Kelley
Interview, supra note 271.
280. Stipulation of Settlement and Dismissal, Congdon v. Metropolitan Council,
No. 703339 (Dist. Ct., Hennepin County, Minn., filed Mar. 3, 1974) (stipulation of
settlement filed Mar. 25, 1975).
281. Id.
282. Kelley Interview, supra note 271.
283. Junghans Interview, supra note 271.
284. Kelley Interview, supra note 271.

285. Hay Interview, supra note 271.
286. May Interview, supra note 271.
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State v. Oscarson27

The State Department of Natural Resources and Otter Tail
County brought suit against an owner of riparian land on a lake in
rural Minnesota. Oscarson, the defendant, had built a wooden retaining wall along his shoreline, but had failed to apply to the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources for a permit to alter the
"cross section" of the lake. 281 Two neighbors on one side of his property had previously erected similar structures,"' and Oscarson
claimed that his project was necessary to preserve the shore that was
gradually being eroded. A corner of Oscarson's wall was catching
debris, however, cluttering a neighbor's beach.290 The neighbor complained to the County Zoning Administrator,"' and eventually the
county and the state jointly sued Oscarson. The complaint cited his
failure to obtain the permit, invoking public nuisance law and MERA
as grounds for an injunction compelling the defendant to "remove so
much of the fill and other materials placed below the normal ordinary
high water level . . .[as] constitutes a change to the cross-section
of the lake and current thereof detrimental to the public interest." ' "
After discovery proceedings, the parties negotiated a settlement
under which Oscarson was permitted to retain part of the structure,
but was required to rebuild the sharp, L-shaped end that was catching debris.293
The attorney who represented both the county and the state
believes that a Rights Act count is useful because it informs the judge
of a major state policy and looks formidable to defense attorneys. He
has concluded, however, that in this case the plaintiffs could have
obtained an injunction without MERA. 9 4 It is also possible
that the affected neighbor could have sued successfully on a private
nuisance theory. "5 Oscarson's attorney simply says that "I think it
could have been resolved" without the MERA count.9
287. This case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents
on file at the district court, State v. Oscarson, No. 7464 (Dist. Ct., Otter Tail County,
Minn., filed May 3, 1974); Telephone Interviews with Paul Grinnell, Attorney for
Defendant Oscarson (Aug. 11 & Oct. 26, 1976); Telephone Interviews with Stephen
Van Drake, Attorney for Plaintiff Otter Tail County (July 23, Aug. 4, & Oct. 26, 1976).
288. Plaintiff's Complaint, State v. Oscarson, No. 7464 (Dist. Ct., Otter Tail
County, Minn., filed May 3, 1974).
289. Van Drake Interviews, supra note 287.
290. Grinnell Interviews, supra note 287; Van Drake Interviews, supra note 287.
291. See Deposition of Walter Oscarson at 14-15, State v. Oscarson, No. 7464
(Dist. Ct., Otter Tail County, Minn., filed May 3, 1974).
292. Plaintiff's Complaint, State v. Oscarson, No. 7464 (Dist. Ct., Otter Tail
County, Minn., filed May 3, 1974).
293. Grinnell Interviews, supra note 287; Van Drake Interviews, supra note 287.
294. Van Drake Interviews, supra note 287.
295. See MINN. STAT. § 561.01 (1976).
296. Grinnell Interviews, supra note 287.
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LAND USE: EMIENT DoMIN

The greatest discernible effect of MERA suits has been in eminent domain cases. Prior to MERA, judicial review of the propriety
of condemnations in Minnesota'-as in most other states-was very
narrow.2 7 The traditional requirements that the taking be "necessary" for a "public purpose"" are usually easy to satisfy. Courts
rarely overrule administrative determinations of necessity, 2" ' and
a highway, for example, serves a public purpose even if the route
will destroy valuable natural resources. 3® The doctrine forbidding a
condemnor to take land that is devoted to a "prior public use" ' does
afford some protection to parks and the like,3'2 but it obviously does
not protect natural resources on private lands. Moreover, courts often
refuse to apply the doctrine when the condemnee is lower in the
hierarchy of sovereigns than the condemnor.0 Thus, a county will be
enjoined from building a road through a state park, = ' but the state
may build a road through a county park.m
297. See State v. Ohman, 263 Minn. 115, 120, 116 N.W.2d 101, 104 (1962);
Housing & Redev. Auth. v. Greenman, 255 Minn. 396, 403-04, 96 N.W.2d 673, 679
(1959); Statev. Severson, 194 Minn. 644, 647, 261 N.W. 469, 471 (1935).
298. See Housing & Redev. Auth. v. Schapiro, 297 Minn. 103, 210 N.W.2d 211
(1973); Northern States Power Co. v. Oslund, 236 Minn. 135, 51 N.W.2d 808 (1952);
Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. Fall Lake Boom Co., 127 Minn. 23, 148 N.W. 561
(1914); In re St. Paul & N. Pac. Ry., 37 Minn. 164, 33 N.W. 701 (1887).
299. The general rule is that the condemnor need not show an absolute or indis.
pensable "necessity," but only that the proposed taking is reasonably necessary or
convenient for the furtherance of a proper purpose. Kelmar Corp. v. District Court,
269 Minn. 137, 142, 130 N.W.2d 228, 232 (1964). See Metropolitan Sewer Bd. v. Thiss,
294 Minn. 228, 200 N.W.2d 396 (1972); Northern States Power Co. v. Oslund, 236
Minn. 135, 51 N.W.2d 808 (1952).
300. MmNN.STAT. § 161.20 (1976) vests the Commissioner of Highways with broad
authority to designate and acquire through condemnation proceedings lands needed
for trunk highway purposes. See State v. Christopher, 284 Minn. 233, 170 N.W.2d 95
(1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1011 (1970); Kelmar Corp. v. District Court, 269 Minn.
137, 130 N.W.2d 228 (1964); State v. Ohman, 263 Minn. 115, 116 N.W.2d 101 (1962);
State v. Voll, 155 Minn. 72, 192 N.W. 188 (1923).
301. See Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. State, 177 Minn. 343, 225 N.W. 164
(1929); Independent School Dist. v. State, 124 Minn. 271,144 N.W. 960 (1914); Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Village of Hartland, 85 Minn. 76, 88 N.W. 423 (1901).
302. See Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. State, 177 Minn. 343. 225 N.W. 164
(1929) (public utility has no authority to condemn a perpetual easement through a
state park for an electric power line).
303. See, e.g., State v. Christopher, 284 Minn. 233, 170 N.W.2d 95 (1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1011 (1970).
304. See Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. State, 177 Minn. 343, 225 N.W. 164
(1929).
305. See State v. Christopher, 284 Minn. 233, 170 N.W.2d 95 (1969) (highway
commissioner can condemn a portion of a local park for state trunk highway purposes),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1011 (1970).
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The broad language of the Rights Act has revamped eminent
domain law so that now any taking may be challenged on the ground
that it "materially adversely affects" natural resources. 31 Unless the
defendant can prove that there is no "prudent and feasible" alternative, the complainant should prevail." 7
1. State ex rel. Nature Conservancy v. Square Butte Electric
Cooperative"'
The Nature Conservancy, a national, nonprofit organization, is
dedicated to the conservation of rare and endangered natural areas. 01
Sometimes it manages the area itself; in other instances, it holds title
temporarily until a governmental
unit can arrange to buy the land
310
from the Conservancy.

The land involved in this case was 300 acres of "native prairie
land," constituting a natural ecosystem of indigenous prairie grasses
that had never been plowed.31 It also provided
a choice habitat for
31
the endangered Greater Prairie Chicken.

1

The power company asked the Conservancy to grant an easement for an electric transmission line through the middle of this
tract. Refusing this request, the Conservancy went ahead with previous plans to lease the land to the state, under an arrangement
whereby the Department of Natural Resources would maintain it as
an official "scientific and natural area. '131 After this lease was exe-

cuted, the company brought condemnation proceedings against the
306.

MINN. STAT.

307.

Id. § 116B.04.

§ 116B.02(5) (1976).

308. This case abstract is based upon information obtained from documents
relating to the condemnation proceedings on file at the district court, Square Butte
Elec. Coop. v. Nature Conservancy, No. 10634 (Dist. Ct., Wilkin County, Minn., Jan.
6, 1976) (complaint filed Sept. 9, 1975); documents relating to the MERA suit on file
at the, district court, State ex rel. Nature Conservancy v. Square Butte Elec. Coop.,
No. 10638 (Dist. Ct., Wilkin County, Minn., filed Oct. 9,1975); Telephone Interviews
with John Flicker, Attorney for Plaintiff Nature Conservancy (Oct. 26 & Dec, 6, 1976);
Interview with Lee Johnson, Attorney for Plaintiff Nature Conservancy, in Minneapolis (Aug. 16, 1976).
309. Flicker Interviews, supra note 308.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. MINN. STAT. § 84.033 (1974), as amended, MINN. STAT. §§ 84.033, 86A.05
(1976), authorized the Commissioner of Natural Resources to acquire by lease "any
interest in lands suitable and desirable for establishing and maintaining scientific and
natural areas." The statute required that lands qualifying as scientific and natural
areas possess "values inherent in the natural condition of the land." Id. The features
that currently qualify an area as a state scientific and natural area are listed in section
86A.05(5).
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Conservancy, as holder of the fee title, and the state, as lessee."' The
condemnees responded by suing the company under MERA. 33 While
this latter case was pending, however, the Conservancy successfully
resisted the separate condemnation petition on the ground that the
company lacked statutory authority to condemn land owned or leased
to the state and used for public purposes." 6 Having thus achieved its
major objective, the Conservancy agreed to a dismissal of its MERA
suit with prejudice.3 17 The power line was later constructed across
nearby farmlands, avoiding the "scientific and natural area."3 '
Although MERA did not affect the outcome of the case, it apparently did affect the ultimate resolution of the underlying controversy.
The decision in the condemnation case precluded the company from
taking any of the 300-acre tract. But one of the Conservancy's main
concerns was that the prairie chickens would kill themselves by flying
into the transmission wires. 319 This danger would have been exacerbated had the company laid its line along a more circuitous route,
skirting the very edge of the property."' The company threatened to
do just that, but eventually relented and agreed to keep the line a
minimum of one-quarter mile from the tract. The Conservancy's attorney attributes this concession to his own counterthreat to proceed
with the Rights Act case.32' Under MERA, but not under the prior
public use doctrine, the Conservancy would have had standing to
challenge the siting decision irrespective of whether the line was to
3
cross its land. 2
2.

State ex rel. Reed v. County of Cass3n
Pleasant Lake, comprising about 910 surface acres, is located in

314. Square Butte Elec. Coop. v. Nature Conservancy, No. 10634 (Dist. Ct..
Wilkin County, Minn., Jan. 6, 1976) (complaint filed Sept. 9, 1975).
315. The condemnees requested a continuation of the condemnation proceedings until the MERA issues had been litigated and such further relief as might be
proper under MERA. Plaintiff's Complaint, State ex reL Nature Conservancy v.
Square Butte Elec. Coop., No. 10638 (Dist. Ct., Wilkin County, Minn., filed Oct. 9,

1975).
316. Square Butte Elec. Coop. v. Nature Conservancy, No. 10634 (Dist. Ct.,
Wilkin County, Minn., Jan. 6, 1976).
317. Stipulation of Dismissal, State ex reL Nature Conservancy v. Square Butte
Elec. Coop., No. 10638 (Dist. Ct., Wilkin County, Minn., filed Oct. 9, 1975) (stipulation of dismissal filed Mar. 17, 1976).
318. Flicker Interviews, supra note 308; Johnson Interview, supro note 308.
319. Flicker Interviews, supra note 308.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. See notes 82-86 supra and accompanying text.
323. This case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents
on file at the district court, State ex reL Reed v. County of Cass, No. 20011 (Dist. Ct.,
Cass County, Minn., filed Jan. 14, 1974); Telephone Interview with Johrr Plattner,
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a sparsely settled, largely forested region in central Minnesota. It is
a popular recreational lake, surrounded by about 56 seasonal homes,
16 permanent homes, and 7 resorts.32' A short distance south of the
western portion of the lake, there is a small spring-fed pond. The Boy
River, a small, shallow creek, runs into the eastern side of the lake.
South of the pond, a county road proceeds in an east-west direction,
the eastern shore of Pleasant
then turns due north, running along
2
Lake, and crossing the Boy River. 1
The county decided to reconstruct and improve this road. Without changing the route, it intended to grade, fill, and in some places
widen the old dirt road. As a first step, eminent domain proceedings
were brought against some of those who owned land abutting the
road . 2 Among these landowners were two exceptionally wealthy families whose vacation estates covered much of the land surrounding the
south end of Pleasant Lake and all of the land enclosing the springfed pond. They brought suit to enjoin the condemnation proceedings. " ' In addition to MERA counts, the plaintiffs alleged that an
environmental impact statement was necessary under state law,32
that there was no public necessity for the project, that the route
selection was arbitrary and capricious, and that a permit that had
been obtained was inadequate under MERA because it failed to pro2
vide safeguards against pollution. '
To buttress their case, the plaintiffs retained a consulting ecologist, whose "preliminary report" described several potential adverse
consequences of the road work on the character of the pond.33 Addressing itself to the county's proposed filling and leveling of a sharp
Attorney for Defendant Cass County (Aug. 12, 1976); Interview with Arthur Walsh,
Attorney for Plaintiff Reed, in Minneapolis (July 26, 1976); Telephone Interviews with
Arthur Walsh, Attorney for Plaintiff Reed (Aug. 10 & Nov. 2, 1976).

324. See generally MINNESOTA'S

LAKESHORE,

supra note 137, at 25.

325. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 3, State ex rel. Reed v. County of Cass, No.
20011 (Dist. Ct., Cass County, Minn., filed Jan. 14, 1974); Walsh Interviews, supra
note 323.
326. Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit A (Petition, County of Cass v. Kilchasky),
State ex rel. Reed v. County of Cass, No. 20011 (Dist. Ct., Cass County, Minn., filed
Jan. 14, 1974).
327. State ex rel. Reed v. County of Cass, No. 20011 (Dist. Ct., Cass County,
Minn., filed Jan. 14, 1974).
328. A state environmental impact statement is required when there is
"potential for significant environmental effects resulting from any major governmental
action." MINN. STAT. § 116D.04(1) (1976).
329. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 5-14, State ex rel. Reed v. County of Cass, No.
20011 (Dist. Ct., Cass County, Minn., filed Jan. 14, 1974).
330. See J. Ludwig, Preliminary Report: An Assessment of the Environmental
Effects and Necessary Considerations for the Reconstruction of C.S.A.H. 45 in Cass
County, Minnesota (Dec. 13, 1973) (unpublished report on file at MINNESOTA LAw
REVIEW).
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dip in the road-where it passed south of the pond,nI the report contended that the fill would raise the water level of the pond, thereby
flooding the intermediate land and making the pond part of the lake
itself. The flooding was also expected to destroy some of the trees on
the surrounding land owned by one of the complainants and to reduce
the value of the pond as a duck breeding ground.32 In addition, the
county's plans for regrading and widening the road in the vicinity of
the Boy River would have necessitated installation of a new and
longer culvert, which the plaintiffs asserted would hamper fish migration.33 Faced with this suit, county officials almost immediately
t
agreed to alter their plans so as to satisfy the plaintiffs
' by using less
fill and eliminating some proposed widenings of the road.rn
The plaintiffs' attorney says that the MERA cause of action was
the core of his case and doubts the validity of the other legal theories.
He attributes the prompt settlement to the novelty of
MERA-"people weren't familiar with dealing with it"-and to the
fact that "those [rural] counties don't have a lot of money, so they
can't afford to spend the county attorney's time fighting what they
envision [to be] a rather beastly lawsuit."' 1 While not disputing this
analysis, the attorney for the county claims that there "was really no
need for a lawsuit. If they had just let us know they were unhappy,
the county would have been more than happy to accommodate
them."3
3.

County of Freeborn v. Brysonm

The county filed a petition to condemn land for the purpose of
relocating a.county highway. To make the highway straighter, and
therefore safer, it was necessary to acquire a strip across nineteen
acres of Bryson's farm that he had set aside as an unofficial wildlife
area. Of these nineteen acres, about seven and one-half were wet331. Id. at 1.
332. Id. at 2-7.
333. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 4-5, State ex reL. Reed v. County of Cass, No.
20011 (Dist. Ct., Cass County, Minn., filed Jan. 14, 1974). The complaint also set forth
other ecological dangers, but these were considered peripheral to the plaintiff's case.
334. Although the Minnesota Commissioners of Natural Resources and of Highways were joined as defendants, the crucial negotiations were between the plaintiffs
and the county. Walsh Interviews, supra note 323.
335. Plattner Interview, supra note 323; Walsh Interviews, supra note 323. The
county also agreed to leave the dip in the road substantially unchanged.
336. Walsh Interviews, supra note 323.
337. Plattner Interview, supra note 323.
338. County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 2 Envt'l L. Rep. (ELI) 20324 (Dist. Ct..
Freeborn County, Minn., 1972), rev'd and remanded, 297 Minn. 218, 210 N.W.2d 290
(1973), trial on remand, Nos. 45601, 45602, 45610 (Dist. Ct., Freeborn County, Minn.,
Aug. 15, 1974), rev'd, 243 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1976).
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lands, including three open water ponds which were part of a larger
slough area beginning south of the farm and continuing several miles
north to Freeborn Lake. Bryson had developed the marsh and the
surrounding area as a wildlife habitat by planting fir trees, excavating the open water ponds, and maintaining a one-acre unharvested
food plot for wildlife. As a consequence of these efforts the marsh area
339
supported abundant and varied plant and animal life.
The proposed highway would have crossed about 600 feet of the
marsh area, eliminating approximately seven-tenths of an acre of
marsh on the Bryson property, including one of the open water ponds
and the surrounding vegetation. Various alternative routes considered by the county were rejected, principally because they were less
safe and more costly. 4
The Brysons, joined by the Sierra Club and the State of Minnesota as intervenors, challenged the condemnation petition under
31
MERA and sought to enjoin the county from taking the marshland. '
After both sides had presented their evidence, the trial court dismissed the MERA action. Despite the sweeping, unqualified language of the Rights Act, the judge decided that the legislature must
not have intended to enlarge the traditionally narrow scope of review
in eminent domain cases.m Applying the traditional test, he concluded that the taking was not "arbitrary and capricious." He also
held that the Brysons lacked standing to sue under MERA because,
as owners of a family farm, they could not be sued under the Act." '
On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, this decision was
reversed."' The court held that the Brysons and the intervenors
had standing, that MERA had altered the law of eminent domain,
and that the complainants had made out a prima facie case of adverse environmental effects. Expressing concern about Bryson's immunity to suit under MERA, 5 the court stated,
When the natural resource is located on land which would be exempt
from suit against the landowner, such as a family farm, the fact that
339. See County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 297 Minn. 218, 220-21, 210 N.W.2d 290,
292-93 (1973).
340. Id. at 221, 210 N.W.2d at 293.
341. The plaintiffs alleged that the proposed condemnation would materially
and adversely affect portions of a natural wildlife marsh, thus structuring their complaint around the language of MERA. See id. at 219, 210 N.W.2d at 292 (1973); MINN.
STAT.

§ 116B.02(5) (1976).

342.
Freeborn
(1973).
343.
344.
345.

See County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 2 Envt'l L. Rep. (ELI) 20324 (Dist. Ct.,
County, Minn., 1972), rev'd and remanded, 297 Minn. 218, 210 N.W.2d 290
Id. at 20330.
County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 297 Minn. 218, 210 N.W.2d 290 (1973).
See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
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there is no guarantee that it will be preserved by the landowner's
future conduct may be balanced against a prima facie showing that
a protectable natural resource presently exists.3"
The case was remanded to the trial court for consideration of the
county's defenses.
Before the case came up for trial again both parties sought to
improve their legal positions, the Brysons by giving the state a perpetual wildlife easement over the marsh, and the county by changing
the proposed route for the highway so that none of the marshland on
Bryson's property would be taken. However, the marsh,, which covered part of a neighbor's tract as well as Bryson's, would still be
partially destroyed. Peterson, the farmer who owned the land through
which the new route would pass, did not object to the proposal.' "
Despite the fact that the marsh would still be damaged, the trial
court again decided in favor of the county. The court conceded that
an alternative route, suggested by Bryson, would not harm the marsh
and probably would not result in significantly increased costs. But it
would have shortened some of Peterson's crop rows, a factor that the
3
judge decided outweighed the environmental advantages. '1
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court characterized the case
as presenting two issues: (1) should the "family farm" exemption be
construed so as to allow the county to benefit from Peterson's
immunity? and (2) where a "feasible and prudent alternative" exists,
may the court nevertheless authorize environmentally destructive
conduct after weighing the alternatives? Concerning the former
issue, the court construed the family farm exemption "to mean that
the only conduct by a landowner which is immune from suit under
the Act is farming or farm-related activity."3' It follows, said the
court, that the possibility that Peterson might attempt to drain his
marshland for farming purposes "is not relevant where the county
proposes highway construction which would adversely affect proximate marshland in a different manner."' Turning to the second
issue, the court noted that "[tihe second proposed route still bisects
the marsh" 1 and would be just as harmful as the first. The question,
therefore, was whether the county had established the affirmative
defense of "no feasible and prudent alternative." To prevail on this
defense, the court held that the defendant must show more than a
balance of competing interests. There must be "a factor of unusual
346. 297 Minn. at 229, 210 N.W.2d at 298.
347. See County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 243 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn. 1976).

348. Id.
349. Id. at 320.
350. Id.
351. Id.
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or extraordinary significance" that outweighs the environmental
harm. 52 Here the additional farmland needed to circumvent the
marsh would
probably not exceed an acre. While it is true that portions of the
Peterson farm would be bisected, causing some inconvenience to
Peterson in farming operations, there is nothing in the record to
indicate that Peterson would be foreclosed from farming the land on
either side of the highway any more than Bryson, whose farm also
will be divided by the proposed road to the north of the marsh, in
proposal or the feasible and prudent
any event, whether the county's
3
alternative is followed .
The court therefore directed entry of judgment against the county.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Many questions might be asked about the drastic doctrinal
changes embodied in a statute like the Minnesota Environmental
Rights Act. Most of the literature has been concerned with the propriety, rather than the efficacy, of enlarging the judicial role in resolving environmental disputes. Although the question of propriety is
important, we also need to learn more about the effects of doctrinal
changes, partly in order to make the debate about propriety less
speculative.
The common objections to this sort of legislation are not supported by the results of our study. Having been cited by complainants
in only 26 cases resolved over five years, MERA certainly has not
resulted in overcrowded court calendars, especially since many of
the suits have been brought in rural areas; lengthy trials have been
very rare; and much, if not all, of the litigation probably would have
occurred even without MERA. Although there has been more litigation in Michigan than in Minnesota, the basic conclusion appears to
be equally valid in both states: litigation under these acts has not
overburdened the courts.3 54 Nor have MERA cases presented judges
352.
353.

Id.
Id. at 321.

354. See Haynes, supra note 103, at 593-96. Cf.

CONSUMER INTERESTS FOUNDATION,

Do CITIZEN Surrs OVERBURDEN OUR COURTS (1973). The Foundation's findings concern-

ing the number of suits in six states were as follows: Indiana, number of suits unknown
(1971-1973); Connecticut, one suit (1971-1973); Florida, three suits (1971-1973); Massachusetts, six suits (1971-1973); Michigan, 33 suits (1970-1972); Minnesota, seven
suits (1971-1973). For various reasons, these findings should be interpreted with caution. They may overstate the amount of "rights act litigation" because they do not
distinguish between cases that would have been brought on some other theory even if
there were no rights act and those that would not. On the other hand, the volume may
be understated because (1) the authors of the Foundation's study obtained their infor-
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with complex scientific questions that are clearly beyond their competence. Of the cases covered by our study, only two raised issues that
were even arguably more complicated than those raised in ordinary
nuisance or zoning litigation. In both cases, involving natural gas
conservationns and fluoridation, s6 the judges refused to disturb the
status quo.
The other major objections to environmental rights acts are more
subjective and consequently more difficult to appraise. To determine,
for instance, whether MERA has encouraged crank suits, one would
need to know much more than we do about the merits of the cases,
and the likelihood that some sort of lawsuit would have been brought
even if MERA had not existed. One must also define the term. If by
"crank suits" we mean cases in which the plaintiff's failure was easily
predictable, then the percentage, but not the number, of such suits
under MERAmay have been fairly high. But the same may be true
of many traditional types of litigation. From the facts that this study
has been able to adduce, only a few of the cases stand out as fairly
obvious lost causes. More important, there is no evidence that protracted MERA suits have been delaying large, important projects s t
There are, to be sure, some cases in which MERA has been
invoked by landowners, sometimes very wealthy ones, who evidently
wished to preserve their residential amenities against projects designed to serve a broader class of people. This phenomenon is not
necessarily deplorable, unless one is prepared to demonstrate, for
example, that the cartway and the development it was intended to
serve inTabaka were in the public interest.31 Furthermore, in most,
mation from state officers such as the attorney general who were, under some state

rights acts, not required to be notified of such suits; (2) even in states that have such
a notification requirement, plaintiffs do not always comply with it; and (3) it seems
reasonable to suppose that as more lawyers become familiar with these acts the volume
of litigation will rise.

Another interpretive problem is that the length and complexity of trials are likely
to be more significant than the number of complaints filed. Even allowing for these
factors, however, 'the reported volume of rights act litigation in all states is so low that
one doubts that state courts will be congested with such suits in the foreseeable future.
In this and other respects the consequences of a comparable federal act might, as some

have supposed, be quite different. See Cramton &Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field: Perilor Promise?, 2 ECOLoGy L.Q. 407, 415-17 (1972).

355. State ex reL Mabley v. Northern States Power Co., No. 703012 (Dist. Ct.,
Hennepin. County, Minn., Aug. 21, 1974) (complaint filed Apr. 10, 1974), discussed in
Appendix at pp. 227-28 infra.
356. State ex rel. Minnesotans Opposed to Forced Fluoridation, Inc. v. City of
Brainerd, No. 37168 (Dist. Ct., Crow Wing County, Minn., Aug. 30, 1973) (complaint

filed Apr. 1972), discussed in Appendix at p. 221 infra.
357. With a more detailed analysis, one of the Michigan studies reached the

same conclusion. SeeHaynes, supra note 103, at 651-58.
358. See State ex rel Tabaka v. Board of Supervisors, No. 20124 (Dist. Ct., Cass

County, Minn., fied Oct. 4, 1974), discussed at notes 237-50 supra and accompanying
text.
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if not all, of the cases with class overtones, the plaintiffs either lost
or would have prevailed even without MERA. 5' Our study thus reveals a danger-but only a danger-that the Rights Act will serve to
fortify entrenched wealth at the expense of the less affluent.
Finally, one may argue that judges should not have as large a role
in deciding major questions of public policy as the Rights Act was
intended to give them. This, of course, is a matter of degree, and
categorical answers are apt to be misleading. The record to date
supports neither the apprehension that judges will usurp legislative
functions nor Professor Sax's rejoinder that they will purify the democratic process by granting injunctions that prompt legislative consideration of dormant environmental issues."'
If, however, the fears of Rights Act opponents have largely
proved to be unfounded, so have the hopes of its advocates. Of the
26 MERA cases resolved within the study period, fifteen were, or
may have been, at least partial successes for the plaintiffs. But, by
a fairly generous tally, the Rights Act appears to have influenced
the outcome in only about half of these cases,3"' and in only two,
359. See Nokomis Community Organization v. City of Minneapolis Bd. of Parks
& Recreation, No. 720757 (Dist. Ct., Hennepin County, Minn., filed Nov. 25, 1976),
discussed in Appendix at p. 226 infra; State ex rel. Tabaka v. Board of Supervisors,
No. 20124 (Dist. Ct., Cass County, Minn., filed Oct. 4, 1974), discussed at notes 23750 supra and accompanying text; State ex rel. Save Our Sites, Inc. v. Murr, No. 77225
(Dist. Ct., Dakota County, Minn., June 1974) (complaint filed May 30, 1974),
discussed in Appendix at pp. 223-24 infra; State ex rel. Reed v. County of Cass, No.
20011 (Dist. Ct., Cass County, Minn., filed Jan. 14, 1974). discussed at notes 323-37
supra and accompanying text.
360. So far as we have been able to ascertain, MERA cases have not produced
any legislative action, perhaps because powerful vested interests, which Sax assumed
would be affected by Rights Act litigation, see text accompanying notes 63-66 supra,
have rarely been disturbed by these cases.
361. See In re Cron, No. 18451 (Dist. Ct., St. Louis County, Minn., July 27, 1976)
(complaint filed Apr. 27, 1975), discussed at notes 251-70 supra and accompanying
text; Square Butte Elec. Coop. v. Nature Conservancy, No. 10634 (Dist. Ct., Wilkin
County, Minn., Jan. 6, 1976) (complaint filed Sept. 9, 1975), discussed at notes 30822 supra and accompanying text; State ex rel. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research
Group v. Kjellberg Dayton Mobile Home Park, No. 703475 (Dist. Ct., Hennepin
County, Minn., filed Apr. 13, 1974), discussed at notes 172-88 supra and accompanying
text; Congdon v. Metropolitan Council, No. 703339 (Dist. Ct., Hennepin County,
Minn., filed Mar. 3, 1974), discussed at notes 271-86 supra and accompanying text;
State ex rel. Reed v. County of Cass, No. 20011 (Dist. Ct., Cass County, Minn., filed
Jan. 14, 1974), discussed at notes 323-37 supra and accompanying text; Bergquist v.
City of Detroit Lakes, No. 18586 (Dist. Ct., Becker County, Minn., filed Dec. 27, 1973),
discussed at notes 152-64 supra and accompanying text; State ex rel. Minnesota Pub.
Interest Research Group v. North Star Chems., Inc., Nos. 74270, 74333 (Dist. Ct.,
Dakota County, Minn., filed June 27, 1972), discussed at notes 222-35 supra and
accompanying text; County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 2 Envt'l L. Rep. (ELI) 20324 (Dist.
Ct., Freeborn County, Minn., 1972), rev'd and remanded, 297 Minn. 218, 210 N.W.2d
290 (1973), trial on remand, Nos. 45601, 45602, 45610 (Dist. Ct., Freeborn County.
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Bryson and Nature Conservancy,' is it clear both that the suit
achieved something and that MERA was essential to that achievement. Resolving all these doubts in favor of MERA's efficacy, one
must still conclude that the direct, immediate effects of MERA litigation on the overall quality of Minnesota's environment have been
insubstantial. After all, even in Bryson only a few of the many thousands of acres of wetlands in the state were directly affected by the
decree.
Why have the direct effects of MERA litigation been so meager
compared to the high expectations expressed in much of the literature
'about environmental litigation? One superficially plausible answer
would be that not enough suits have been brought. Doubtless, the
rather low volume of suits, especially by citizens' groups, is partly due
to the expense of litigation. As a rule, none of the statewide environmental organizations can afford to pay all the expenses associated
with even a single lawsuit. At most, they pay out-of-pocket expenses
while in varying degrees the attorneys donate their time. u" Another
possible reason for the paucity of cases is that many lawyers may still
be unfamiliar with this relatively new statute.' Hence, as familiarity
with the statute increases, so may the volume of Rights Act litigation.
But increased attorney familiarity will not alleviate the cost problem,
and therefore the percentage of actions brought by ideologically motiMinn., Aug. 15, 1974), rev'd, 243 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1976), discussed at notes 338-53
supra and accompanying text.
362. County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 2 Envt'l L. Rep. (ELI) 20324 (Dist. Ct.,
Freeborn County, Minn., 1972), rev'd and remanded, 297 Minn. 218, 210 N.W.2d 290
(1973), trial on remand, Nos. 45601, 45602, 45610 (Dist. Ct., Freeborn County, Minn.,
Aug. 15, 1974), reo'd, 243 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1976), discussed at notes 338.53 supra
and-accompanying text.
363. Square Butte Elec. Coop. v. Nature Conservancy, No. 10634 (Dist. Ct.,
Wilkin County, Minn., Jan. 6, 1976) (complaint filed Sept. 9, 1975), discussed at notes
308-22 supra and accompanying text.
364. Interview with Charles Dayton, Attorney for the Sierra Club, in Minneapo.

lis (Oct. 24, 1977). These cost considerations probably explain why MPIRG, with its
full-time staff attorneys, subsidized by student fees, was the only organization that
brought more than one suit during the study period.

According to Dayton, the Sierra Club is unique among Minnesota's environmental groups in that it usually compensates its attorneys for their time, although at lower
rates than would be received from private clients.
MERA makes no provision for awarding attorneys' fees, costs, and disbursements.
State law provides that attorneys' fees are generally not allowed, except where authorized by contract or statute. State v. Carter, 300 Minn. 495, 497, 221 N.W.2d 106, 107
(1974). There are exceptions to the general rule: for example, where a party is seeking
to recover or protect a common fund, Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n.,
257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960). In judicial proceedings generally, the prevailing
party is allowed to recover disbursements, MmIN. STAT. § 549.04 (1976), and a nominal
amount as costs, id. § 549.02.
365. About half of the suits covered by the study were brought by the state or
by private attorneys who had known about MERA since its enactment.
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vated plaintiffs will probably not rise significantly. A statutory allowance of attorneys' fees might alleviate this problem, but if it were
applied to defendants as well as plaintiffs it could do more harm than
good."'
It would be a mistake, however, to treat the low number of
MERA suits as critical. The effects of Rights Act cases would probably not have been much different if there had been twice as many
cases and the plaintiffs had invariably prevailed. By and large, the
suits brought under MERA were not ones that were likely to establish
major principles, or at least they were not pursued with that end in
view. The most obvious explanation is that, despite the abolition of
standing requirements, the typical MERA plaintiff, like the typical
common law plaintiff, has been an aggrieved property owner, less
interested in establishing a principle than in preserving his own residential environment or saving some nearby resource about which he
cares. Of course, such motives should not always be disparaged, but
they do limit the Act's potential efficacy in resolving problems that
do not directly and severely affect someone's economic interest and
in establishing broad guidelines that will alter the behavior of nonparties. During the Act's first five years, there was only one appellate
decision,367 and MPIRG-the single most frequent MERA plain366. In the 1973 session of the Minnesota Legislature there were three unsuccessful attempts to amend MERA to authorize a court to award attorneys' fees and costs
to a successful plaintiff. See H.F. 150, 68th Minn. Legis., 1973 Seas., in MINNESOTA
LEGISLATURE: HOUSE BILLS 339 (1973); H.F. 680, 68th Minn. Legis., 1973 Sess., in
MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE: HOUSE BILLS 777 (1973); S.F. 2686, 68th Minn. Legis., 1973
Sess. Although one such bill was passed by the House, no comparable Senate bills were
ever reported out of committee. No such amendments were offered in the 1975-1976
sessions. A bill authorizing such awards, however, has been referred to both House
and Senate committees of the 1977 session. See H.F. 1561, 70th Minn. Legis., 1977
Sess.; S.F. 1333, 70th Minn. Legis., 1977 Sess. The bill may be acted upon when the
legislature reconvenes in January 1978.
367. Three recent appellate decisions, outside our study period, should be noted.
In In re City of White Bear Lake, 247 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1976), the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a decision by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to
deny a permit for construction of a roadway that would have encroached upon a bay
of Birch Lake. The DNR found that the encroachment would destroy valuable wetlands along the shoreline, reduce the water surface area of the lake, and accelerate
eutrophication, consequences that could be avoided by "feasible and prudent" alternative routes. Sustaining this decision, the court cited both previous appellate decisions
in Bryson, as well as language of the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act. MINN.
STAT. § 116D.04(5), (6) (1976), similar to that of MERA forbidding permits that are
likely to cause "pollution, impairment, or destruction" of natural resources when there
is a "prudent and feasible alternative." 247 N.W.2d at 906-07 & n.4.
The well-known Reserve Mining controversy provided the setting for a second
appellate discussion of MERA. Reserve Mining Co., after protracted litigation, see
generally United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 543 F.2d 1210, 1211 n.1 (8th Cir. 1976);
Note, Reserve Mining-The Standard of Proof Required to Enjoin an Environmental
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tiff-never pursued a Rights Act case through a trial on the merits.
Except perhaps for the Sierra Club in Bryson, even the ideological
plaintiffs generally seem to have been more concerned with resolving
specific problems, brought to their attention by affected landowners,
than with creating new law. If the individual cases had had a more
significant environmental impact, this failure would not be so serious. But the cases usually have been rather minor, and therefore the
failure to establish general standards that may affect governmental
or corporate conduct is a serious shortcoming of MERA litigation.3
To a degree, this failure is due to the fact that some of the
Hazard to the PublicHealth, 59 MNN.L. REv. 893, 894 n.4 (1974), was enjoined from
further discharge of its taconite tailings into Lake Superior. See United States v.
Reserve Mining Co., 417 F. Supp. 789 (D. Minn.), al'd, 543 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976).
Given until April 15, 1980, to "effect complete termination of taconite discharges,"
United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 431 F. Supp. 124, 1249 (D. Minn. 1977), Reserve
sought state permits for an on-land disposal site at "Mile Post 7," not far from its plant
at Silver Bay. The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency and Department of Natural
Resources rejected the permit applications, relying on a hearing officer's findings that
the Mile Post 7 site would "materially adversely affect the environment" and that a
more remote site ("Mile Post 20"), creating fewer environmental dangers, would be a
"prudent and feasible alternative." On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that none of the findings of environmental danger at Mile Post 7 was supported by
substantial evidence and that Mile Post 20 was a less desirable site from both environ.
mental and economic standpoints. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808
(Minn. 1977). The court gave several reasons for rejecting the agencies' contention that
MERA justified denial of the permits: the evidence of environmental harm was too
speculative, id. at 829-30; the Mile Post 20 site would entail environmental problems
that in-the court's opinion were more serious than those at Mile Post 7, id. at 831; and
the court feared that Reserve would close its plant rather than use the more distant
site, id.at 841. Concerning the legal relevance of the admittedly drastic economic
impact that such a closure would have, the court concluded that "it is only where the
likelihood of danger to the public is remote and speculative that economic impacts
which are devastating and certain may be weighed in the balance to arrive at an
environmentally sound decision." Id. at 841. Since the court, contrary to the hearing
officer, the agencies, and the several environmental organizations that had intervened,
regarded Reserve as such a case, it ordered the agencies to issue permits for deposit of
the tailings at Mile Post 7.
Finally, Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club,
257 N.W.2d 762 (Minn.1977), involved a trap-and-skeet shooting facility near a small
lake in the Twin Cities area. This project was opposed by virtually all of the nearby
landowners, who joined MPIRG in a suit under MERA to prevent it. The Minnesota
Supreme Court upheld an injunction against the shooting because excessive noise
would impair the "quietude" of the area-a protected "resource" under MERA. id. at
768-77-and lead shot would have toxic effects if ingested by wildlife, id. at 777.80.
Since the defendant did not even endeavor to show that there was no prudent and
feasible alternative site, the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction. Id. at 781.
368. Doubtless, this shortcoming will eventually be rectified, after which such
issues as the wisdom of the decisions and the extent to which they are altering conduct
of nonparties will become more prominent.
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greatest environmental cases in Minnesota, such as Reserve Mining"'
and the efforts to curb logging and mining in the Boundary Waters
Canoe Area, 370 have been brought wholly or principally under federal
law and were therefore not affected by MERA. Reserve Mining and
the Boundary Waters cases had two characteristics in common: they
arose out of exceedingly conspicuous kinds of environmental problems, in which the issues and the appropriate defendants were readily
identifiable, and environmental organizations were parties. " The
point is not so much that federal law has preempted the important
environmental issues as that it has preempted many of those that are
sufficiently visible and controversial to provoke a suit by statewide
citizens' groups. Environmental degradation is generally cumulative,
the result of thousands of relatively inconspicuous events, as when a
marsh is filled by erosion or a river is gradually transformed by shoreland development. Federal law has not preempted state regulation of
most such matters. But because there is rarely any single event in the
process that is sufficiently visible and objectionable to provoke a
lawsuit, cumulative degradation is difficult to resist by litigation.
Consequently, the "nibbling phenomenon," advanced by Professor
Sax as a major justification for a public right to environmental quality,37 is precisely the kind of problem that litigation is least likely to
solve.
There is, then, a nexus between property rights and environmental rights that is in large measure independent of doctrinal changes;
it depends less on who has standing to sue than on who perceives an
environmental intrusion and cares enough about it to bear the cost
of litigation. Consider, for example, the eminent domain cases, which
have produced the most tangible results so far under MERA.373 With369. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 543 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976). Although the federal courts resolved the question whether Reserve may continue to
discharge its taconite tailings into Lake Superior, the state courts decided where the
new on-land disposal site should be located. Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d
808 (Minn. 1977), discussed at note 367 supra.
370. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.
1976) (logging); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th
Cir. 1974) (logging); Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974)
(mining).
371. Environmental concerns were represented in the logging cases by the Sierra

Club and MPIRG; in the mining case by the Izaak Walton League; in the Reserve case
by the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, the Pollution Control Agency, the
Attorney General, the Save Lake Superior Association, the Sierra Club, MPIRG, and
the Minnesota Environmental Control Citizens Association.
372. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
373. See notes 297-353 supra and accompanying text. The eminent domain
cases include: five of the 26 suits covered by this study; four of the fifteen arguably
"successful" suits; four of the eight suits in which MERA seems most likely to have
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out meaning to belittle the "environmental" implications of these
cases, it seems significant that they all involved direct, physical
threats to private property, so that visibility was not a problem and
the landowners were willing to pay the expense of litigation. What is
more, eminent domain is one of the few areas of traditional law
where, before MERA's enactment, landowners, including public or
charitable ones like the Nature Conservancy, often lacked adequate
legal doctrines to resist serious invasions of their domain. In short,
the eminent domain cases were relatively successful because property
interests were at stake and consequently the abstract doctrinal
7
changes of MERA were readily enforceable. '
Environmental rights should be distinguished from environmental powers, with which they are often confused. Under MERA, one's
rights no longer depend upon one's property; everyone has the equivalent of a "property right" to environmental quality. But the right to
environmental quality is "public" only in a special sense. Its enforceability still depends on wealth. This analysis helps to explain the low
number of suits challenging state agency permits and regulations as
inadequate to protect the environment.3 5 The provision in MERA
that allows such suits"' was a major departure from previous law
under which standing to challenge administrative regulations was
"
generally confined to affected property owners. n But so far the putative beneficiaries of the new right-ideologically motivated citizens-have not enforced it. One partial explanation is that some of
the state agencies, for all their faults, generally regulate environmental quality about as strictly as the political climate and the courts will
allow. 8 Still, there are many hundreds of regulations that could be
influenced the outcome; both of the suits in which MERA clearly did influence the
outcome; and the only MERA suit in which there was an appellate decision.
374. This theory is necessarily rather speculative, especially in view of the paucity of empirical data from other states with rights acts. In Michigan, eminent domain cases are somewhat less prominent-than in Minnesota, while understandably air
pollution suits and, inexplicably, suits by and against state agencies are more common.
See Haynes, supra note 103, at 685-95. However, the general thesis advanced herein
appears to be consistent with the Michigan data. For example, the small number of
suits by statewide organizations and the relatively large number by government agencies probably reflect the latter's superior financial resources and their full-time involvement in environmental regulation. See generally notes 108-12 supra and accompanying text.
375. The only suit to do so was State ex rel. Reed v. County of Cass, No. 20011
(Dist. Ct., Cass County, Minn., filed Jan. 14, 1974), discussed at notes 323-37 supra
and accompanying text. A similar phenomenon has been observed in Michigan. See
Haynes, supra note 103, at 642.
376. MIN. STAT. § 116B.10 (1976).
377. See generally 2 F. CooPza, supra note 12, at 531, 535-36, 539; Note, supra
note 87, at 575, 620.
378. Indeed, some of the most important environmental decisions in Minnesota
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attacked under MERA, and it is inconceivable that they are all satisfactory to the Sierra Club and similar groups. Such organizations,
however, do not have the resources to monitor regulations as closely
as industry does. This is particularly important with respect to pollution control standards, which are commonly expressed in technical
jargon that is incomprehensible to laymen. Finally, even when they
have perceived state regulations as too weak, the environmental
groups have usually refrained from litigation under MERA, choosing
instead to husband their scarce resources for legislative and administrative lobbying." ' Although their right to litigate has been expanded
enormously, their power to do so is not much greater than it was
before MERA.
What this Article counsels is not cynicism about environmental
rights litigation but a sense of proportion about its limitations. So far,
have curbed the regulatory power of state agencies. See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v.
Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1976), discussed at note 367 supra; Schwermann v.
Reinhart, 296 Minn. 340, 210 N.W.2d 33 (1973); Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency, 294 Minn. 300, 200 N.W.2d 142 (1972); North Suburban
Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. Water Pollution Control Comm'n, 281 Minn. 524, 162 N.W.2d
249 (1968); State v. Kuluvar, 266 Minn. 408, 123 N.W.2d 699 (1963). The literature
about environmental litigation has generally ignored the conservatism of many state
court judges, as if they were somehow unable rather than unwilling to abolish the
traditional doctrinal obstacles in environmental litigation. Rather than being relics of
a bygone age, preserved by the sheer weight of precedent, some of these doctrines
appear to reflect contemporary judicial values. Perhaps the best example is the
"comparative injury" doctrine, under which courts sometimes refuse to enjoin nuisances if the harm to the plaintiff is relatively slight and compensable by a money
judgment, while the cost of abatement is very high. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text. In New York, the oldest case in point rejected the doctrine, but a more
modern one reestablished it. Compare Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1,
101 N.E. 805 (1913), with Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d
870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). The Minnesota Supreme Court has ostensibly rejected
the doctrine, but sometimes seems to be swayed by similar considerations. Compare
Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., 143 Minn. 374, 173 N.W. 805 (1919), and
O'Malley v. Macken, 182 Minn. 294, 234 N.W. 323 (1931), with Brede v. Minnesota
Crushed Stone Co., 146 Minn. 406, 178 N.W. 820 (1920).
Most recently, the Reserve Mining case illustrates the reluctance of judges to
create a risk of substantial unemployment for the sake of what are thought to be
excessively speculative environmental benefits. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst. 256
N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1977), discussed at note 367 supra.
379. The Minnesota chapter of the Sierra Club has, with considerable effort,
raised enough money to retain two environmental lawyers as part-time lobbyists, Ironically, these lobbyists have found that the most valuable provision of MERA to environmentalists is the one that gives citizens the right to intervene in administrative proceedings, MINN. STAT. § 116B.09(1) (1976), because as a rule they find that participation in the administrative process is more cost-effective than litigation. Dayton Interview, supra note 364; see notes 364-66 supra and accompanying text; cf. Haynes, supra
note 103, at 594-95 (describing a similar trend in Michigan).
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it seems that Hines was much nearer to the mark than Sax:" in both
Michigan and Minnesota, the role of Rights Act litigation has been
essentially peripheral. Yet the Rights Act-still an infant compared
to most legal institutions-has not failed in any absolute sense. Its
most obvious effect has been to establish that condemnors must give
considerable weight to the environmental results of their actions-a
sensible rule, however much one may debate its application to individual situations. But the question remains, what is the effect of a
decision like Bryson? Will it significantly alter the conduct of county
highway departments? Of other condemnors? If so, at what cost to
other values, such as highway safety? These questions are by no
means wholly academic. Insofar as we mistakenly presume that doctrines are efficacious, we may be lulled into neglecting possible statutory and administrative solutions to problems that only seem to have
been resolved by litigation. Although there is an endless flow of articles praising decisions that establish environmental rights,u' very few
authors have attempted to determine the effects of these rights.
Without professing to resolve such questions, let us conclude by
considering some reasons why the indirect effects of environmental
rights may, like the direct ones, be less powerful than scholars usually
suppose.3s2 For one thing, the Rights Act is very nebulous. In one
respect, this quality is an obvious advantage: the Act could not be
so comprehensive and flexible if it were much more precise. But from
another perspective, MERA's breadth and consequent opacity is a
disadvantage because one rarely can predict whether it will induce a
court to enjoin any particular activity that is otherwise lawful. When
this consideration is coupled with the paucity of suits to enforce the
Act and the fact that a successful suit leads only to an injunction,
rather than a fine, a damage award, or imprisonment,3m it is far from
clear that the Act's deterrent effect is very strong even in those situations where a prospective defendant considers the Rights Act before
making an environmental decision.
Of course, the deterrent effect of MERA probably differs among
various classes of actors. Almost certainly, some types of people-farmers for instance-often make "environmental decisions"
either without consulting an attorney, or after consulting one who
takes account only of more specific and familiar regulations such as
380. Compare text accompanying note 28 supra, with text accompanying notes
37-67 supra.
381. See, e.g., sources cited in note 103 supra.

382. The evidence of indirect effects in the Michigan studies is sparse and anecdotal. See, e.g., Sax & Conner, supra note 103, at 1050-53.
383. It would surely have been unjust, if not unconstitutional, to include these
sanctions in such a vague statute.
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the local zoning ordinance.-" Industries that have obtained the necessary permits from local and state agencies and that have a strong
financial incentive to choose a course of action that is relatively insensitive to environmental quality may also pay little attention to the
Rights Act. Even those civil servants whose mission is to protect the
environment and who might interpret the Act as authority for standing firm in some circumstances where they would otherwise be dubious about their legal right to do so are affected by so many other
scientific, administrative, political, and legal constraints that one
wonders whether more than a minute fraction of administrative decisions with environmental impacts can accurately be attributed to the
Rights Act. s
Most likely, appellate decisions in MERA suits will be more
influential than the bare statute because their commands are more
definite. If so, the direct effects of MERA litigation will be the major
determinant of the indirect effects. In other words, it is more plausible to suppose that Freeborn County's highway department will
mend its ways after Bryson than, for example, that Northern States
Power Company will make extra efforts to reduce thermal pollution
in response to the general language of the act itself. There is, however,
considerable evidence that-at least in the field of land use controls-nonparties, and even parties, often ignore or evade judicial
decisions,"' so that even the rule in Bryson may not have much effect,
especially outside Freeborn County, except to the extent that it is
enforced by more litigation.
For all these reasons, a tentative skepticism concerning the efficacy of Rights Act litigation seems justifiable pending further studies
that provide evidence about the effects of environmental rights on
nonlitigants. If this Article helps to persuade scholars to undertake
such research and to look critically at the claims made in behalf of
environmental litigation, it will have served its purpose.

384. See text accompanying note 365 supra.
385. See, e.g., Bryden, The Impact of Variances: A Study of Statewide Zoning,
61 MINN. L. REv. 769, 787-815 (1977).
386. See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRAMCES AND POLICIES 13,
156 (1966).
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APPENDIX
UNSUCCESSFUL CASES BROUGHT UNDER THE
MINNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ACT

A. WATER POLLUTION
1. State ex rel. Minnesotans Opposed to Forced Fluoridation,
Inc. v. City of Brainerd, No. 37168 (Dist. Ct., Crow Wing County,
Minn., Aug. 30, 1973) (complaint filed Apr. 21, 1972). This case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents at the
district court and from the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion in a
related case, Minnesota State Bd. of Health v. City of Brainerd, 241
N.W.2d 624, 626-27 (Minn. 1976) (City of Brainerd not barred by the
doctrine of res judicata from litigating the constitutionality of the
Minnesota Fluoridation Law, despite the trial court's ruling in State
ex rel. Minnesotans Opposed to Forced Fluoridation,Inc. v. City of
Brainerd that the statute was constitutional).
Under MINN. STAT. § 144.145 (1976) (original version at ch. 603,
§ 1, 1967 Minn. Laws 1221), the Minnesota Legislature required
fluoridation of municipal water supplies, so as to maintain a fluoride
content to be prescribed by the State Board of Health. The most
vigorous political and legal opposition to fluoridation came from a
group of residents of the Brainerd area called Minnesotans Opposed
to Forced Fluoridation. After Brainerd had installed the equipment
necessary to fluoridate its water, this group brought suit to enjoin the
project. The complaint set forth four causes of action, alleging that
fluoridation is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, that it is
"arbitrary and capricious" and therefore unconstitutional, that the
amount of fluoride required by the Board of Health would adversely
affect the environment, violating MERA, and that the Board's regulation prescribing this amount fails adequately to protect the environment, again in violation of MERA. During the trial on the merits,
the major factual issue was whether so many people are intolerant to
fluoridation that other means should be used to prevent tooth decay.
After listening to the testimony of numerous expert witnesses produced by both sides, the trial court dismissed the complaint. In the
memorandum accompanying his order, the judge construed the word
"environment" in MERA narrowly, excluding from the definition
direct, harmful effects upon people. He also rejected the plaintiff's
argument that MERA had altered the traditional burden of proof. On
the merits, the court found that only "a very small group of experts"
oppose fluoridation, whereas the great majority of scientists and
reputable organizations consider it safe.
2. State ex rel. Ludwig v. City of Bemidji, No. 23232 (Dist. Ct.,
Beltrami County, Minn., Oct. 27, 1972) (complaint filed Dec. 12,
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1971), aff'd, 298 Minn. 27, 212 N.W.2d 876 (1973). This case abstract
is based upon information obtained from the documents on file at the
district court; Telephone Interview with George L. Duranske, Attorney for Plaintiff Ludwig (Nov. 10, 1976).
Plaintiff, the Director of the Center for Environmental Studies
at Bemidji State College, owned riparian land on the Mississippi
River, slightly less than a mile below the point at which the City of
Bemidji discharges its sewage into the river. The city evidently was
not treating its sewage adequately. The Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency had revoked the city's sewage disposal permit, but improved
treatment methods had not yet been adopted. Ludwig brought suit,
alleging both a common law nuisance and a violation of MERA. The
trial judge held that the PCA's revocation of Bemidji's permit was
invalid because the Agency's notice of the revocation proceedings
had been inadequate. In effect, then, Bemidji still possessed a PCA
permit and was consequently not subject to suit under MERA. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the MERA count, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, the nuisance claim was
dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the parties.
3. Paragon Land Dev. Corp. v. Girling, No. 686538 (Dist. Ct.,
Hennepin County, Minn., filed May 31, 1972). This abstract is based
upon information obtained from the documents filed with the district
court in the case cited above and in a companion suit brought by the
plaintiff to obtain a rezoning, Paragon Land Dev. Corp. v. City of
Robbinsdale, No. 685517 (Dist. Ct., Hennepin County, Minn., filed
May 4, 1972); Telephone Interviews with Peter Ruffenach, Attorney
for the City of Robbinsdale (July 29 & Aug. 1, 1977).
In Paragona developer requested a rezoning by the City of Robbinsdale to allow construction of a motel on the shore of Crystal Lake.
The request was denied, partly because Paragon was reluctant to
spend the sum necessary to connect the proposed motel with existing
sewer lines. Thereafter, Paragon brought two separate suits: one
against the city to force a rezoning and another against Girling, whose
house was adjacent to Paragon's land. Girling's sewage disposal system was not connected to the existing sewer lines; instead, she used
a septic tank. If the city or Girling were required to extend the sewer
lines to Girling's house, the cost of connecting the extended line to
Paragon's motel would be substantially reduced. With this objective,
Paragon-relying almost exclusively on MERA-sought injunctive
relief against Girling and four other defendants, alleging that Girling's septic tank was polluting the lake while the other defendants
polluted by discharges through, and inadequate construction of,
storm sewers. But Paragon later abandoned both suits, largely on the
ground that even if an injunction were obtained against Girling the
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court probably would not order construction of the sewer line extension.

B. LAND USE
1. State ex rel. Reinhart v. County of Nicollet, No. 17945 (Dist.
Ct., Nicollet County, Minn., filed Nov. 1973). This case abstract is
based upon information obtained from documents on file at the district court; Telephone Interview with Alwin Mueller, Attorney for
Plaintiff Reinhart (Aug. 24, 1976); Telephone Interview with William
G. Peterson, Special Assistant Attorney General for the Department
of Natural Resources (Nov. 3, 1976).
MINN. STAT. §§ 106.011-.673 (1976) provides for public proceedings to drain wetlands, including the powerful prerogatives of eminent domain and special assessments. Although the drainage code
requires that the county boards that approve such projects give due
consideration to environmental values, id. § 106.021(6)(d)-(i), in
practice the scales are heavily weighted in favor of the proponents
of drainage. In Reinhart, a group of farmers petitioned the Nicollet
County Board to establish a drainage ditch to drain about 2,700
acres of land, including 100 acres of marshland supported by a natural watercourse flowing through plaintiff's property. The marshland
provided habitat and nesting areas for waterfowl, and, when the
Board approved the farmers' project, the impending loss of this resource became the basis for plaintiff's Rights Act suit against the
county. The plaintiff did not pursue the Rights Act case, however,
choosing instead to fie a statutory appeal from the Board's decision.
That appeal was successful in the trial court; but the Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed, Schwermann v. Reinhart, 296 Minn. 340,
210 N.W.2d 33 (1973), declaring that if wetlands are to be preserved,
the government ought, under Mum. STAT. § 97.481 (1976), to buy
them rather than to disallow drainage because of its environmental
effects.

2. State ex reL. Save Our Sites, Inc. v. Murr, No. 77225 (Dist.
Ct., Dakota County, Minn., June 1974) (complaint filed May 30,
1974). This case abstract is based upon information obtained from
documents on file at the district court; Interview with Charles Dayton, Attorney for Plaintiff Save Our Sites, in Minneapolis (Nov. 1,
1976); Telephone Interview with Patrick Farrell, Attorney for Defendant Murr (Nov. 4, 1976).
Murr owned an undeveloped tract of land, comprising about five
acres, on "Sunrise Hill," near the Mississippi River south of the Twin
Cities. To the north and west, the land abutted a large public park.
Also in a northerly direction, and to the east, there was an attractive
residential neighborhood.
Most of Murr's land was zoned single-family residential, but a
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small portion was zoned for multiple-family dwellings. Murr applied
for a rezoning to allow multiple-family construction on the whole
tract. After many of the neighbors spoke against this petition, it was
denied. Murr then offered to sell the land to the neighbors (organized
as "Save Our Sites") for his acquisition price. They in turn solicited
financial assistance from various charitable sources and tried to persuade local government officials to condemn the land for park purposes. Murr finally decided that these efforts were taking too long and
proceeded with plans to build an apartment complex.
The opponents then brought suit to enjoin construction. Their
admitted goal was to delay development long enough to persuade the
government to buy the land. Aside from its value as an unofficial
neighborhood park, the vacant land allegedly had once been the winter home of the Little Crow Band of Indians. It was thus alleged to
be an "historical" resource within the meaning of MERA. The complaint suggested that the land might be attached to the adjoining
Kaposia Park and serve as the location for a replica Indian village
and a county historical museum. This resulting "historical and open
space site" would also contain the nearby "Kochendorfer Home," one
of the oldest residences in South St. Paul. The plaintiffs also alleged
that development would adversely affect the atmosphere around the
park and that Murr had failed to obtain a required municipal excavation permit. The trial judge granted a temporary restraining order
and required the plaintiffs to post a $1,000 bond. After a hearing,
however, the restraining order was vacated, and the court awarded
the bond to Murr, stating:
The Court is of the opinion that the interest sought to be protected by plaintiff does not come within the zones of interests contemplated by the legislature under the Minnesota Environmental
Rights Act. Concern for the preservation of possible historic sites is
a laudable goal but is insufficient to confer standing under the existing law.
It appears totally improper for a Court of Law to temporarily
impede reasonable free use of property pending possible public acquisition . ...
The matters raised with respect to zoning and permits should
be directed to the City of South St. Paul.
State ex rel. Save Our Sites, Inc. v. Murr, No. 77225 (Dist. Ct.,
Dakota County, Minn., June 1974) (complaint filed May 30, 1974)
(order denying temporary injunction).
Since MERA's definition of natural resources explicitly includes
historical resources, this reasoning is difficult to understand. Yet the
plaintiff decided not to appeal because by the time the case reached
the Minnesota Supreme Court the site would have been excavated,
and it seemed unlikely that the judge would enjoin excavation pending the appellate decision.
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3. O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, No. 398980 (Dist. Ct., Ramsey
County, Minn., filed Aug. 6, 1974). This case abstract is based upon
information obtained from documents on file at the district court.
The St. Paul Masonic Temple, a 60,000-square foot granite
structure built about 65 years ago by James J. Hill, was "not architecturally distinguished from the outside and [had] little historical
significance." Minneapolis Tribune, Oct. 6, 1974, § D (Arts), at 4,
col. 4. The city bought the building for about $1,400,000, intending
to demolish it in order to build an approach to a highway. O'Brien,
a citizen whose interests include preservation of municipal landmarks and opposition to freeways, led the battle to save the Temple,
joined by some of the smaller local performing arts group that lacked
adequate facilities. Their case rested on the Temple's magnificent
interior:
The showplace is the auditorium, very European. Many people
think the intricate plaster work and hand painting were done by
Italian craftsmen imported here in the Hill style. Floors are wood.
The stage is approximately the same size as that at O'Shaughnessy
Auditorium. The fly space is 60 feet high. A graceful, horseshoeshaped balcony has 300 seats still in it and a working organ.
Off the auditorium, on each of two stories, are two smaller, more
elegant rooms-O'Brien calls them Mozart Room One and
Two-that have almost perfect acoustics and would be ideal for both
rehearsals and chamber concerts.
Id., cols. 4-5.
Basing his claims on MERA and the Minnesota Environmental
Policy Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 116D.01-.07 (1976), O'Brien sought temporary and permanent injunctions against demolition of the Temple
as well as an order requiring preparation of an environmental impact
statement. But the trial judge denied the motion for a temporary
injunction, stating that the temple was not a protected "natural resource" within the meaning of MERA and that the plaintiff had not
demonstrated a "material effect on the environment." O'Brien v.
City of St. Paul, No. 398980 (Dist. Ct., Ramsey County, Minn., filed
Aug. 26, 1974) (order denying temporary injunction). For other reasons, he also denied the request for an impact statement. Thereafter, the plaintiff dismissed the action with prejudice.
O'Brien finally found a sympathetic city administrator, and at
last report it seems possible that private donations can be arranged
to defray the colossal cost of moving the Temple out of the path of
the highway. See Minneapolis Tribune, Oct. 6, 1974, § D (Arts), at
4, col. 3.
4. Loring Park Environmental Defense Fund v. City of Minneapolis, No. 708373 (Dist. Ct., Hennepin County, Minn., filed Oct. 25,
1974). This case abstract is based upon information obtained from
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the documents on file at the district court.
The city had designated a "Loring Park Redevelopment Area,"
consisting of nine blocks in which all but eight buildings were to be
demolished and replaced by high density housing containing 2,736
residential units. The Loring Park Environmental Defense Fund, an
association of property owners, brought suit to enjoin the project on
several grounds, including MERA. The court, acting under MINN.
STAT. § 562.02 (1976), ordered the plaintiff to post a (surety) bond of
$100,000 or the action would be dismissed. Thereafter, the parties
stipulated that the defendants would waive all claims for costs in
consideration of the plaintiff's agreement not to appeal, and the
case was dismissed with prejudice.
5. Nokomis Community Organization v. City of Minneapolis
Bd. of Parks & Recreation, No. 720757 (Dist. Ct., Hennepin County,
Minn., filed Nov. 25, 1975). This case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents on file at the district court.
The case arose out of a dispute about the location of a community recreational center for use by residents of the Minneapolis
neighborhoods surrounding Lake Nokomis. In 1974, the Minneapolis
Park Board announced its decision to build the center on park land
owned by the city and managed by the Board on a bluff overlooking
the lake. It was to be at least two stories high, containing indoor
athletic facilities such as swimming pools and gymnasiums serving
some 30,000-50,000 people.
The Nokomis Community Organization was an ad hoc group of
nearby residents, formed for the purpose of opposing this project.
They brought suit to prevent construction of the center at the bluff
site. Citing the Rights Act, the complaint stated that the building
would impair the beauty of the publicly owned bluff area and attract
noisy traffic. The complaint also contended that an environmental
impact statement was required by state law. Finally, the plaintiffs
alleged irregularities in the process by which the site had been
approved.
The trial court ordered the plaintiffs to post a $60,000 security
bond under MINN. STAT. § 562.02 (1976) and, when they failed to do
so, dismissed the action with prejudice.
6. City of W. St. Paul v. Bisanz, No. 72628 (Dist. Ct., Dakota
County, Minn., Sept. 23, 1971) (complaint filed June 25, 1971). This
case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents
on file at the district court; Telephone Interview with Will Hartfeldt,
Attorney for the Intervenors (Nov. 1, 1976).
The city began condemnation proceedings against Bisanz to acquire land for an indoor ice arena. The proposed site was a small
public park owned by the city, subject to Bisanz's right to repurchase
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it if the land was used for anything but a park. This land was "left
over from all the apartment development" in the area, having been
dedicated as a park because it was "too hilly to build on." Within this
little preserve, there were aspen trees, cattail, foxes, rabbits, and
various songbirds.
Although Bisanz did not contest the condemnation, residents of
a nearby apartment intervened in the proceedings, arguing that the
proposed taking was invalid both under traditional eminent domain
law because the land had already been devoted to a "prior public
use" and under MERA because the arena would disrupt natural resources and destroy the "quietude" of the environment. The trial
court ruled for the city, finding that the proposed taking was for a
necessary public use, that the city had exercised reasonable discretion, and that the project was not likely to impair natural values
protected by MERA.
Having lost in the courtroom, the intervenors subsequently obtained a favorable political solution. The city agreed to paint the rink
in earthen tones and to construct the associated parking lot in a place
where it would interfere less with the objectors.
7. Citizens for a Better Hutchinson v. Minnesota Dep't of Natural Resources, No. 15017 (Dist. Ct., McLeod County, Minn., Mar.
23, 1976) (complaint originally filed in Ramsey County District
Court, Citizens for a Better Hutchinson v. Minnesota Dep't of Natural Resources, No. 408082 (Dist. Ct., Ramsey County, Minn., filed
Oct. 1975); change of venue to McLeod County District Court
granted Dec. 17, 1975). This case abstract is based upon information
obtained from documents on file at the Ramsey and McLeod County
District Courts.
The Department of Natural Resources had granted two permits
to the city for construction of a bridge across the South Fork of the
Crow River. At the proposed site, the "river" is really a reservoir,
connected with adjacent lakes, and is a popular recreation site. Opponents of the project appealed from the permit decisions, alleging nine
causes of action, some of which were based upon MERA. The trial
court dismissed-every count except the one that treated the case as
an ordinary appeal from a DNR decision, a decision that the complainants believed would result in a narrower scope of review than
would have been available under the MERA counts. After starting to
prepare an appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, they decided not
to pursue the case.

C. ENERGY PoLIcY
1. State ex rel. Mabley v. Northern States Power Co., No.
703012 (Dist. Ct., Hennepin County, Minn., Aug. 21, 1974) (coin-
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plaint filed Apr. 10, 1974). This case abstract is based upon information obtained from the documents on file at the district court.
This was a class suit by the Minnesota Public Interest Research
Group, the Minnesota Environmental Control Citizens' Association,
and individual users of natural gas against several users and suppliers
of natural gas. Its purpose was to obtain an injunction against supplying and using natural gas for decorative outdoor lighting on the theory
that this is a wasteful practice that depletes a valuable natural resource. Confronted with this large issue of public policy, the trial
court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, relying on
a triad of debatable legal grounds: MERA protects only indigenous
natural resources (the natural gas originates in another state); consumption of natural gas is not "pollution, impairment or destruction"
within the meaning of MERA; and the landowners' exemption in
MERA precludes an injunction against the users of the decorative
lamps. In addition, the court concluded that the difficulties of proving that defendants' actions "materially adversely affect the environment are insurmountable."

